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Abstract
As the U.S. government’s reach and responsibilities expand, it remains unclear exactly what, if
any, input the general populations of Afghanistan, Iraq, or the United States have on government
actions. The environmental needs of the two States have concerned the world enough that the
United Nations Environment Program (”UNEP”) has published a detailed post-conflict report on
Afghanistan (”Afghanistan PCA”) and a “Desk Study” of the environment in Iraq (”Iraq Desk
Study”). There are four basic ways that citizens can attempt either to enjoin U.S. government
environmental action abroad or compel the government to adhere to established regulations and
agreements: (1) private citizen or NGO suit under U.S. federal law; (2) private citizen or NGO
suit under international law or one seeking to compel compliance with a treaty or agreement that
the United States is party to; (3) suit by a non-U.S. national against the United States under a
recognized treaty or against a U.S. corporation under ATCA; or (4) a qui tam action alleging
fraudulent or illegal action by a party that costs the United States financially.
COMMENT
CITIZENS CANNOT STAND FOR IT ANYMORE:
HOW THE UNITED STATES' ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIONS
IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ GO UNCHECKED BY
INDIVIDUALS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
Wynne P. Kelly*
"This land is your land & this land is my land-sure-but the
world is run by those that never listen to music anyway."1
INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in U.S. foreign policy2 have resur-
rected issues not seen since the occupations of Germany and Ja-
pan immediately after World War 11.1 The role of occupier' is
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1. Bob Dylan, Sacred Cracked Voice & the fingleJangle Morning (1970).
2. See, e.g., Colin L. Powell, A Strategy of Partnerships, 83 FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb., at
22 (2004) (describing status of U.S. foreign policy including situations in Afghanistan
and Iraq); George Melloan, Clash of Civilizations? It's Not That Simple, WALL ST. J., Mar.
30, 2004, at A19 (noting difficulties of establishing democracy in both Afghanistan and
Iraq due to complex issues present); Elisabeth Bumiller, White House Letter; Planning the
Budget for 2 Countries at Once, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at A13 (noting need of United
States to budget for operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq).
3. See Allen W. Dulles, lashback: "The Present Situation in Germany", 82 FOREIGN
AlT., Nov./Dec., at 2 (2003) (describing situation in occupied Germany of 1945, which
editors compare to current Iraqi occupation); see also Lt. Col. Mark Martins, USA, No
Small Change of Soldiering: The Commander's Emergency Response (CERP) in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, 2004-FEB A my LAw. 1, 1 n.4 (2004) (noting Operation Iraqi Freedom is first time
since occupations of Germany andJapan that United States has assumed role of occupy-
ing power); Suzanne Nossel, Winning the Postwar, 2003-JUN LEGAL AFF. 18, 19-21 (2003)
(drawing lengthy comparison between occupations of Germany and Japan after World
War II and applicable international law and current occupation of Iraq).
4. See DavidJ. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 842, 846 (2003)
(highlighting United Kingdom's and United States's embracing of role of occupiers
and accompanying occupational law); see also S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 4761st mtg. at
1, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1483] (clarifying status of
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one that, while not novel in U.S. history, remains uncomforta-
ble.5 As the U.S. government's reach and responsibilities6 ex-
pand, it remains unclear exactly what, if any, input the general
populations of Afghanistan, Iraq, or the United States have on
government actions.7 One integral issue that has not dominated
the discourse thus far is the protection of the environments' of
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the history of interna-
tional environmental legislation and treaty-making. Part I will
also examine the particular environmental concerns present in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Part II will recount the United States' re-
sponse to international environmental actions, both in the diplo-
matic and domestic arenas, and the procedural bars to individu-
als and Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs") bringing ac-
tions to protect the environments of Afghanistan and Iraq. Part
Iraq and previous U.N. Security Council Resolutions and noting United Kingdom and
United States as occupying forces); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct.
21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Geneva IV] (noting rules for victorious Nations in oc-
cupied lands).
5. See Ian Fisher, Iraqis Ambush a US. Convoy; GI. 's Raid Cell, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/17/international/middleeast/
17IRAQ.html (reporting that violence against U.S. forces still persists well after formal
conflict has ceased); see also Carlotta Gall & Amy Waldman, Afghanistan Faces a Test in
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/
15/international/asia/15AFGH.html (highlighting difficulties confronting establish-
ment of democracy in Afghanistan post-Taliban regime); Eric Lichtblau, Demonstrators
Demand U.S. Withdraw Troopsfrom Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2003, at A18 (noting Califor-
nia demonstrations calling for withdrawal of military forces from Iraq).
6. See Scheffer, supra note 4, at 846 (stating increased responsibilities of United
Kingdom and United States as occupying forces and further stating that other contrib-
uting Nations may be exempt from liability while United Kingdom and United States
retain total responsibility); see also S.C. Res. 1483, supra note 4 (clarifying status of Iraq
and previous U.N. Security Council Resolutions and declaring forces of United King-
dom and United States as occupying ones); Geneva II, supra note 4; Geneva IV, supra
note 4.
7. See, e.g., Madeleine Albright, Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?, 82 FOREIGN ArF., Sept./
Oct., at 2 (2003) (noting lack of citizen and international support for Bush's actions in
Iraq and lack of stability in Afghanistan). But see Japan Promises Cooperation in Environ-
ment Protection with Arabs, JIJI PRESS ENG. NEWS SERV., Mar. 27, 2004, available at 2004 WIL
56396358 (noting Japanese Environment Minister meeting with Arab environmental
leaders to address environmental issues in region).
8. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 555 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "environmental ef-
fect" as "natural or artificial disturbance of the physical, chemical, or biological compo-
nents that make up the environment").
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II will specifically examine the judicial and executive responses
in the United States to international environmental concerns af-
fecting the United States and its government agencies abroad.
Part III will discuss possible avenues for both private citizens and
NGOs to attempt to watch over corporate and governmental ac-
tions affecting the environments in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
I. HISTOPJCAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PLIGHTS OF AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ AND CITIZENS'
INABILITY TO GAIN ACCESS TO U.S. COURTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM ABROAD
A. A Brief History of U.S. Involvement in International
Environmental Regulation
Until relatively recently, the responsibility of environmental
regulation and protection rested with individual States.9 As
more factors1 ° and indicators demonstrated the transnational
impact of environmental issues, however, their importance in in-
ternational diplomacy" and negotiation greatly increased. 2
9. See Sumudu Atapattu, The Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted?: The
Emergence of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment Under International Law, 16 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 65, 79-81 (2002) (discussing shift in viewing pollution and environmental
harm as being State or Inter-State issue to global issue); see also Prasad Sharma, Restoring
Participatory Democracy: Why the United States Should Listen to Citizen Voices While Engaging
in International Environmental Lawmaking, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1215, 1217 n.4 (1998)
(quoting Declaration of United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 at 5 (1972)) (stating that at Stockholm Conference on
Human Environment of 1972, participating States held that resources were held by
individual Nations for their use and exploitation).
10. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 1033 (4th ed. 2003) (noting globalization of environmental problems is product
of several factors like worldwide population growth, expanding scale of international
economic activity, and knowledge of humankind's impact on earth's ecosystems); see
also BHARAT H. DESAI, INSTITUTIONALIZING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 70-106
(2004) (discussing large increase in awareness of international environmental issues
and Stockholm Conference on Human Environment as turning point in international
cooperation that led to more multi-lateral agreements regarding environment); Rich-
ard A. Rinkema, Environmental Agreements, Non-State Actors, and the Kyoto Protocol: A
"Third Way"for International Climate Action?, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 729, 735-36
(2003) (noting growth in activity of international organizations, particularly United Na-
tions, in regulation and attempted protection of the environment); Sharma, supra note
9, at 1215-19 (noting increase in international environmental legislation and reasons
for heightened awareness of international environmental issues).
11. See, e.g., Robin L. Juni, The United Nations Compensation Commission as a Model for
an International Environmental Court, 7 ENVrL. LAw. 53 (2000) (noting importance of
establishment of international tribunal for environmental claims and suggesting United
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The number of regulations and treaties dealing primarily with
the environment expanded exponentially.13 Countries have also
become more cognizant of the impact of war and military con-
flict on the environments of Nations embroiled in battle and
sought to address the issue of how to limit the environmental
destructiveness of battle. 4
The United States, the world's largest generator of green-
house gases,15 exhibits a mixed record of participation in the
drafting and enforcement of international environmental trea-
ties." The unpredictability and wavering reliability of the
Nations Compensation Commission that hears claims arising from First Persian Gulf
conflict as model); Dan Meyer & Everett E. Volk, "W" For War and Wedge? Environmental
Enforcement and the Sacrifice of American Security - National and Environmental - to Complete
the Emergence of a New "Beltway" Governing Elite, 25 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 41, 69-72 (2003)
(suggesting U.S. domestic and foreign policy coupled with unclear public international
law creates uncertainty as to U.S. role in environmental affairs); Lesley Wexler, The
International Deployment of Shame, Second-Best Responses, and Norm Entrepreneurship: The
Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Landmine Ban Treaty, 20 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
561, 569, 581-82 (2003) (noting use of shaming and normative tactics to enjoin
landmine usage seen as detrimental to both environment and human population by
States that are non-parties to treaty banning landmines).
12. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 1033 (noting rise in awareness of interna-
tional environmental issues and agreements); see also Sharma, supra note 9, at 1222-24
(noting increase in international environmental agreements).
13. See Sharma, supra note 9, at 1223-26 (noting increase in international regula-
tion particularly since 1945); see also Andrew Bove, A Study of the Financial Mechanism of
the Montreal Protocol On Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 9 ENVrL. LAw. 399 (2003)
(noting relative success of Montreal Protocol which required funds from developed
countries to go to developing countries to assist them in achieving compliance).
14. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law
of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1997) (noting increased aware-
ness of environmental effects of war after Vietnam Conflict); Ens. Florencio J. Yuzon,
USN, Deliberate Environmental Modification Through the Use of Chemical and Biological Weap-
ons: "Greening" the International Laws of Armed Conflict to Establish an Environmentally Pro-
tectiveRegime, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'v 793, 796-97 (1996) (noting need for interna-
tional law to directly address issues of destructive usage of environment for military
strategical purposes); Lynn Berat, Defending the Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a
Crime of Genocide in International Law, 11 B.U. INT'L LJ. 327, 329-33 (1993) (noting inter-
national common law's developing recognition of Nations' common responsibility to
protect environment).
15. See, e.g., Laura Thorns, A Comparative Analysis of International Regimes on Ozone
and Climate Change with Implications for Regime Change, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 795,
797 (2003) (noting significance of U.S. departure from Kyoto Protocol as United States
is largest emitter of greenhouse gases); Eileen Claussen, Climate Change: Present and
Future, 27 ECOL. L.Q. 1373, 1378 (2001) (noting United States responsible for 25% of
greenhouse gases while making up less than 5% of global population).
16. See Richard D. Lazarus, A Different Kind of "Republican Moment" in Environmental
Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1000-02 (2003) (discussing Daniel A. Farber, Politics and
Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 66 (1992) (noting that modern
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United States in its support of such treaties leads to their ineffec-
tiveness in both overall effect' 7 and lack of enforcement author-
ity.
18
The administrations of Presidents Nixon' 9 and Clinton,20
environmental concern in the United States came out of a spurt of public willingness to
"undergo sacrifices to promote the public good"); see also James G. Pope, Republican
Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 287, 292 (1990). Professor Lazarus also notes the current Bush administration has
taken steps similar to the Reagan administration which "undertook a series of widely
publicized changes in the direction of national environmental policy that drew the con-
demnation of environmentalists, the protest of leaders in the opposing political party,
and the attention of the national news media." Lazarus, supra, at 1006-07; see also
Thorns, supra note 15, at 825-30 (noting combination of industrial lobbying, Congres-
sional reticence to allow developing world an edge, and new Bush administration's ties
to oil equaled drastic cutback in U.S. support for Kyoto Protocol).
17. See Joseph DiMento, International Environmental Law: A Global Assessment,
[2003] 33 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,387 (noting ineffectiveness of Basel Con-
vention, Kyoto Protocol, and Montreal Protocol due to either lack of U.S. participation
or failure to ratify domestically); see also DESAI, supra note 10, at 256-81 (advocating new
vision of international environmental institutions as current views and implementation
of agreements have not been effective enough). Further, by not participating in many
international environmental agreements, the United States virtually renders moot many
of these accords due to its accounting for such a huge percentage of the regulated
wastes and pollution. See DiMento, supra, at 10,387 (discussing need for U.S. participa-
tion for achievement of environmental treaty goals); see also Anita Margrethe Halvor-
ssen, Climate Change Treaties - New Developments at the Bueons Aires Conference, 1998 COLO.
J. Ir'L ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 1, 20-21 (1998) (opining that without U.S. participation in
Kyoto Protocol, agreement will be ineffective due to large proportion of U.S. emis-
sions).
18. See generally Markus Ehrmann, Procedures of Compliance Control in International
Environmental Treaties, 13 COLO.J. INT'L ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 377 (2002) (noting difficulty
enforcing environmental agreements and forcing compliance, particularly without U.S.
participation or when U.S. terms are not met). But see Randi E. Alarcon, The Convention
on International Trade in Enforcing CITES and the United States Solution to Hindering the
Illegal Trade of Endangered Species, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 105, 119-21 (2001) (noting so-
phisticated U.S. and international legislation and support implemented by United
States to protect endangered species).
19. See J. BROOKS FLIPPEN, NIXON AND THE ENVIORNMENT 50-79 (2000)) (noting
extensive environmental legislation passed during Nixon administration); see also Rob-
ert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Execu-
tive, 51 DuKE L.J. 963, 987 (2001) (noting Nixon administration's regulatory review
program's focus on environmental regulatory issues); C.M. Cameron Lynch, Environ-
mental Awareness and the New Republican Party: The Re-Greening of the GOP?, 26 WM. &
MARY ENVrL. L. & POL'v REv. 215, 220-22 (2001) (noting Nixon's seemingly sincere
concern about environmental issues and legislation passed during his tenure to attempt
to preserve environment).
20. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investi-
gation, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 821, 866 (2003) (recalling Clinton White House's propensity
towards supporting environmental regulation); see also Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1007-
09 (explaining reversal by President George W. Bush of most Clinton administration
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respectively, set the high-water marks for U.S. environmental
regulation and activism. Nixon signed into law the most sweep-
ing U.S. environmental legislation, including the creation of the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the Clean Air Act,
and the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") .21 Presi-
dent Clinton participated in the most aggressive international di-
plomacy relating to the environment, seeking environmental
analysis of trade agreements and negotiating with other States to
pass the Kyoto Protocol.22
The establishment of EPA during the Nixon administration
led to a vast expansion of both federal regulation and enforce-
ment powers regarding the U.S. environment,23 but also resulted
in uncertainty over what entity holds ultimate responsibility for
the environment's protection. 24 While Congressional will con-
environmental regulations and restrictions); Ian A. Bowles & Cyril F. Kormos, The Inter-
national Conservation Mandate of the United States Government, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 372,
375-76 (2003) (noting sweeping environmental legislation signed by both Presidents
Clinton and Nixon).
21. See Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1006-07, 1026-27 (noting both President Nixon's
initial pro-environmental legislation, such as National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), formation of Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, and his backing away from environmental issues at end of presi-
dency); see also Lynch, supra note 19, at 221 (noting Nixon's sincere concern for U.S.
environmental issues).
22. SeeJames Salzman, Seattle's Legal Legacy and Environmental Reviews of Trade Agree-
ments, 31 Ev-rL. L. 501, 503 (2001) (noting President Clinton's issuance of Executive
Order 13,141 which committed United States to review trade agreements for environ-
mental concerns); see also Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1006 (noting current administra-
tion's reversal of Clinton environmental agreements); David W. Floren, Antarctic Mining
Regimes: An Appreciation of the Attainable, 16J. ENvrL. L. & LITIG. 467, 500 n.209 (2001)
(noting United States under President Clinton began to show sustained commitment to
strengthening international environmental law, for example, by negotiating strenuously
both in United States and abroad for Kyoto Protocol).
23. See generally M.R. (Vega Alta), Inc. v. Caribe General Elec. Products, Inc., 31 F.
Supp. 2d 226, 227-29 (D.P.R. 1998) (noting obligation of EPA to enforce environmen-
tal regulations it promulgates). See Rebecca A. D'Arcy, The Legacy of Dames & Moore v.
Regan: The Twilight Zone of Concurrent Between the Executive and Congress and a Proposal for
a Judicially Manageable Nondelegation Doctrine, 79 NOTRE DAmE L. REv. 291, 296 (2003)
(discussing EPA's ability to promulgate environmental regulations but inability to
amend Congressional environmental law).
24. See D'Arcy, supra note 23, at 296-98 (highlighting EPA's mandated role of en-
forcing environmental regulations but Congressional obligation to create effective legis-
lation); see also Joseph D.Jacobson, Safeguarding National Security Through Public Release of
Environmental Information: Moving the Debate to the Next Level, 9 ENrL. LAw. 327, 381-83
(noting environmental hazard information controlled by EPA but access limited by De-
partment of Defense and Attorney General); Joel Stroud, Beyond Title Search: Attorneys
Must Consider Environmental Regulations, 25 N.C. CENT. L. J. 182, 187 (2003) (acknowl-
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trols when Congress explicitly states its intentions in a body of
law,25 an agency (such as EPA) possesses more power when the
enabling legislation is ambiguous and that agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute is given great deference.26 This deference is
not dispositive, though, and has recently been weakened in the
environmental context.27 Further, statutory interpretation and
expansion in the international environmental context has been
severely limited by Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,28 where the U.S.
Supreme Court held that individuals must demonstrate particu-
larized harm to gain standing to enforce environmental statutes
abroad. 29  EPA does, however, have bilateral cooperative pro-
grams with other national and regional environmental agencies
to attempt to further common goals of environmental protec-
tion; it notably does not with Afghanistan or Iraq.3
edging EPA's role in administering environmental regulations but noting responsibili-
ties it shares with Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, National
Fisheries Service of the Department of Commerce, Army Corps of Engineers, and De-
partment of Agriculture).
25. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) (holding where Congress has clearly spoken on issue, court's review
of agency's construction ends and Congressional intent controls); see also Jonathan
Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges' Interpretations of State Law,
77 S. CAL. L. REv. 975, 1021 (2004) (discussing U.S. courts' deference to agency inter-
pretations after Chevron).
26. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (holding that gap in Congressional intent can
and should be filled by agency to which promulgation and enforcement of regulations
has been charged); see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of
Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 897 (2004) (discussing cases where Chevron deference
deemed appropriate when Congress is silent and agency seeks to fill gap in legislation).
27. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (holding that where administrative interpretation
stretches limits of Congressional power Chevron deference is not appropriate); FD & P
Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 239 F. Supp. 2d 509, 514-17 (D.N.J.
2003) (noting Supreme Court holding in Solid Waste's limitation of Clean Water Act's
application by EPA and decision to withhold Chevron deference to Army Corps of Engi-
neers in that context).
28. 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that neither individuals alone nor as Non-Gov-
ernment Organization ("NGO") have standing to bring claim to enforce Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000) for actions done with U.S. funding abroad despite
extremely elastic grant of rights of action in statute).
29. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-62 (noting "someday intentions" of plaintiffs to re-
visit areas at issue did not constitute particularized harm satisfactory to establish stand-
ing); see also Hon. C. Ashley Royal, U.S.DJ., M.D. Ga., Constitutional Civil Rights, 55
MERCER L. REv. 1131, 1132 (2004) (discussing application of particularized and con-
crete harm requirement expressed in Lujan to lower court cases).
30. See Countries and Regions, Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Interna-
tional Affairs, Official Website, available at http://www.epa.gov/international/regions/
index.html (last visited May 17, 2004) (detailing Nations and regions that United States
200 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 28:193
While historically a leader in conservation efforts,31 the
United States has been conspicuously absent from some of the
most recent international environmental agreements. 3 2 This lack
of participation, coupled with a U.S. trend of restricting citizen
access to U.S. courts for international environmental concerns, 3
does not bode well for citizen oversight of the Afghan and Iraqi
environments.
34
B. Environmental Concerns Particular to Afghanistan and Iraq That
Must Be Addressed
The arid Middle East region is particularly sensitive to dra-
has bilateral environmental agreements with, of which Afghanistan and Iraq are not
part).
31. See Bowles & Kormos, supra note 20, at 373 (noting United States has long
history of leadership in conserving world's natural resources including endangered bio-
logical diversity); see also Salzman, supra note 22, at 503 (noting commitment by United
States to evaluate all international trade agreements for environmental ramifications).
32. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Ratification Resisted: Understanding America's
Response to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1989-2002, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
493 (2002) (examining U.S. failures to ratify Biological Diversity Convention and both
political and practical rationales offered for abandoning agreement); Louis Henkin,
How Are Nations Behaving?, 96 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 205 (2002) (noting U.S. failure to join
several treaties with environmental components, specifically mentioning Kyoto Proto-
col).
33. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555 (1992) (holding that private citizens without
clear intent to revisit areas where species are endangered do not have standing despite
general grant by Congress in Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000)); Beanal
v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding district court did not
err in holding that non-U.S. plaintiffs lacked standing for actions by U.S. companies
abroad detrimental to environment); Molly M. White, Home Field Advantage: The Ex-
ploitation of Federal Forum Non Conveniens by United States Corporations and Its Effects on
International Environmental Litigation, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rzv. 491 (1993) (noting use of
forum non conveniens to avoid litigation in United States for environmental harm com-
mitted abroad); Michael Burger, Bi-Polar and Polycentric Approaches to Human Rights and
the Environment, 28 COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 371, 381 (2003) (noting international environ-
mental law does not recognize individual right of action).
34. See, e.g., Afghanistan Is On Brink of Natural Disaster - UN Study, IRISH TIMES (Dub-
lin), Jan. 30, 2003, at P12 (noting U.N. report stating Afghanistan on verge of environ-
mental catastrophe due to drought and effects of warfare); Babak Dehghanpisheh, Fall
of Eden; To Punish Rebels, Saddam Hussein Tried to Destroy Iraq's Southern Marshes. Will the
Country Be Able To Rebuild Them In Time?, NEWSWEEK I'rr'L, June 23, 2003, at 48 (noting
destruction of Iraqi marshes could be worst environmental disaster of twentieth cen-
tury); Peter H. Kostmayer, The Coming Water Wars, THE RECORD (Bergen County, NJ),
Apr. 22, 2003, at L15 (reporting that coming shortage of water in Iraqi region could
lead to environmental disaster). But see Ann Imse, Seasoned Ecologist Heads to Iraq; Denver-
ite to Help War-Torn Country Clean Up Hazards, RocKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), May 3, 2003,
at 4A (noting that former regional administrator for EPA sent to Iraq to help with
environmental issues there).
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matic environmental fluctuations and water shortages." In both
Afghanistan 6 and Iraq," regional and individual concerns exist.
Iraq's need for water has forced it to trade oil (its most valuable
resource) for water rights to the Euphrates and Tigris.3" Afghan-
istan also suffers from water shortage issues. 9 The presence of
35. See John Alan Cohan, Modes of Warfare and Evolving Standards of Environmental
Protection Under the International Law of War, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 481, 490 (2003) (noting
widespread environmental harm done by both Afghan-Soviet War and recent Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom); see also Melanne Andromecca Civic, A New Conceptual Frame-
work for Jordan River Basin Management: A Proposal for a Trusteeship Commission, 9 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'v 285, 286-89 (1998) (noting severe water shortage in Jordan
River Basin and effect on countries near Afghanistan and Iraq); Ludwik A. Teclaff, Fiat
or Custom: The Checkered Development of International Water Law, 31 NAT. RES. J. 45, 46
(1991) (noting long, contentious history of water rights in Mesopotamian region); Af-
ghanistan is On Brink of Natural Disaster- UN Study, supra note 34, at P12 (reporting on
pressing Afghan environmental issues); Dehghanpisheh, supra note 34, at 48 (reporting
on Iraqi marshland destruction's environmental consequences).
36. See Ben Boer, The Rise of Environmental Law in the Asian Region, 32 U. RiCH. L.
REv. 1503, 1514-16 (1999) (noting Afghanistan's entry into South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation whose environmental wing, South Asian Cooperative Environ-
ment Program, addresses particularized issues); see also Afghan Governor, French Official
Discuss Green Issues, B.B.C. MON. S. ASIA, Sept. 9, 2004 (reporting on meeting between
former French environment minister and governor of Balkh Province in Afghanistan
regarding environmental progress and remaining issues in region). But see Seymour M.
Hersh, ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY: The Other War, NEW YORKER, Apr. 12, 2004,
at 40 (noting breakdown in political structure of Afghanistan and lack of centralized
control that leads to violence, insecurity, and reticence of foreign aid agencies to invest
and expand in Nation).
37. See David Shelby, Iraqi Marsh Arabs Raise Their Voices Over Future of Wetlands Iraqi
Marsh Arabs Discuss Future of Wetlands - Newly Formed Council Studies Issues Related to Re-
flooding of Marshes, ST. DEP'T PRESS RELEASES & Doc., Mar. 22, 2004, available at 2004 WL
59150914 (noting demands of Maysan Marsh Arab Council and quoting opinions that
marshlands can be restored with diligent attention to environment); see also AL-BAWABA
NEWS, Mar. 23, 2004, available at 2004 WL 64572992 (noting difficulties ahead for any
plans to re-flood portions of marshland drained during regime of Saddam Hussein due
to environmental, cultural, and health concerns); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Two Rivers
and the Lands Between: Mesopotamia and the International Law of Transboundary Waters, 10
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 213, 224-34 (1996) (discussing past conflicts among Iraq, Syria, and
Turkey over water reserves and predicting future problems); Luan Low & David Hodg-
kinson, Compensation For Wartime Environmental Damage: Challenges to International Law
After the Gulf War, 35 VA.J. INT'L L. 405, 409-12 (1995) (explaining long term effects of
oil fires set by Iraqi Army in first Gulf War and their possible violations of international
law).
38. See Yonatan Lupu, International Law and the Waters of the Euphrates and Tigris, 14
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 349, 366 (2001) (describing current water crisis in Iraq, Jor-
dan, and Syria and plan to trade oil for water with Turkey); see also Eyal Benvenisti,
Water Conflicts During the Occupation of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 860, 865-69 (2003) (noting
specific obligations of occupying forces to ensure viable drinking water for people of
Iraq).
39. See, e.g., Ali Azimi & David McCauley, Afghanistan's Environment in Transition
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foreign nationals in the two States4" strains the already depleted
resources of the environments41 and highlights the lack of inter-
national environmental law applicable to military or peacekeep-
ing forces.4 2
These military forces4 3 and peacekeepers call international
attention to the existing delicate environmental situation in
these two countries, as armed conflict has been a nearly ever-
present hardship for the past twenty years.4 4 Afghanistan's peo-
ple have experienced a constant state of war since the Soviet in-
(Asian Development Bank: South Asia Department, Dec. 2002) at 9 (noting water sup-
ply and management most crucial environmental issue in Afghanistan); Bryan Pearson,
Afghanistan's Environment Choked by War, Bombing, Drought, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan.
24, 2002, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6
004c8ad5/aadfb7lb56fb7be0cl256b4b003d9ed4?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 26,
2004) (noting environmental destruction linked to history of conflict in Afghanistan
and water shortage but quoting local professor who believes retention and adequate
management of water could alleviate problem).
40. See, e.g., James P. Rubin, Stumbling Into War, 82 FoREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct., at 46
(2003) (noting diplomatic failures leading to U.S. military presence in Iraq); Marc
Lynch, Taking Arabs Seriously, 82 FoREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct., at 81, 86 (2003) (noting
difficulties facing U.S. personnel in both Afghanistan and Iraq).
41. See Shelby, supra note 37 (noting effects of past detrimental actions taken in
Iraq on Iraqi people); see also Rudy S. Salo, When the Logs Roll Over: The Need for an
International Convention Criminalizing Involvement in the Illegal Timber Trade, 16 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REv. 127, 136-37 (2003) (noting destruction of Afghan forests for use by ter-
rorist organizations, particularly Al Qaeda, to sell for profit)
42. See, e.g., Carl Bruch & John Pendergrass, Type II Partnerships, International Law,
and the Commons, 15 GEO. INT'L ENvrL. L. REv. 855 (2003) (noting need for interna-
tional law to address environmental issues for corporations and Nations in both peace
and war); Donald 0. Mayer, Corporate Governance in the Cause of Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANs
NAT'L L. 585, 649 (2002) (noting effects of foreign incursions and civil wars on environ-
ments of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kuwait); Salo, supra note 41, at 128-30 (noting lack of
international environmental ban on illegal timber trade and its effects on various Na-
tions).
43. See, e.g., Lt. Col. Richard A. Phelps, USAF, Environmental Lawfor Overseas Instal-
lations, 40 A.F. L. REv. 49 (1996) (noting differences between "environmental law" ap-
plicable to U.S. Air Force military installations abroad and U.S. regulation); Maj. Rich-
ard M. Whitaker, USA, Environmental Aspects of Overseas Operations, 1995-APR ARw LAw.
27 (1995) (noting environmental law issues facing U.S. Army operations both in U.S.
and abroad). However, these policies and their enforcement are beyond the purview of
this Comment. In the case of U.S. military involvement in the conflicts, there are well-
established environmental policies dictated by the several branches intended to govern
military installations and actions. See Whitaker, supra, at 27 (alluding to various military
regulations regarding environmental protection); see also Phelps, supra, at 49 (discuss-
ing military's environmental regulations' prospective application abroad).
44. See Paul Freedman, International Intervention to Combat the Explosion of Refugees
and Internally Displaced Persons, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 565, 580-83, 595-96 (1995) (noting
displacement of large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq due to extended
armed conflict); see also Erika Feller, The Evolution of the International Refugee Protection
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vasion of 197915 and civil war coupled with undeclared internal
violence have affected the daily lives of Afghans for over two de-
cades.4 6
Similarly, Iraqis suffered through the bloody Iran-Iraq War
in the 1980s, 4v the first Persian Gulf War4" in 1991, economic
sanctions after that war in the 1990s,"9 and the most recent con-
flict with a U.S. and British-led force to oust Saddam Hussein in
2003.50 In each of these conflicts affecting the two Nations, envi-
Regime, 5 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 129, 134 (2001) (noting more than 2.5 million refugees
have fled war-torn areas of both Afghanistan and Iraq as a result of recent conflicts).
45. See Jonathan Fowler, New Anti-terror Operation Launched in Afghanistan as Govern-
ment Loyalists Seek More Help Against Taliban, Assoc'D PRESS NEWSWIRES, Nov. 10, 2003
(noting that civil war raged in Afghanistan from immediately after conflict with U.S.S.R.
until U.S.-led overthrow of Taliban); see also Kathy Gannon, Afghanistan Unbound, 83
FOREIGN AFF., May/June, at 35 (2004) (describing particularly brutal attacks between
warlords' militias on each other and civilians in Afghanistan).
46. See Country Profile: Afghanistan, B.B.C. NEWS WORLD ED., Mar. 4, 2003, available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/countryprofiles/1162668.stm (last visited
Mar. 26, 2004) (noting continued civil wars after defeat of Soviet forces in 1989); see also
Zalmay Khalilzad & Daniel Bynam, Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State, WASH.
Q., Winter 2000, at 66-67 (noting quick transformation of Afghanistan from U.S. for-
eign policy success during Cold War to dismal failure as civil war and rise of Islamic
fundamentalist regime caused dire unrest in country).
47. See Andrea Cunning, The Safeguarding of Cultural Property in Times of War &
Peace, 11 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 211, 227-28 (2003) (commenting on effects of Iran-
Iraq war on Iraqi society and lamenting destruction of cultural heritage sites); see also
Tikkun A. S. Gottschalk, The Realpolitik of Empire, 13J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'v 281, 295
(2003) (noting effects of Iran-Iraq War on citizenry including attacks on Iraqi citizens
by their own government); Davis Brown, Enforcing Arms Control Agreements by Military
Force: Iraq and the 800-Pound Gorilla, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. RaV. 159, 202-04
(reporting use of chemical and biological weapons in Iran-Iraq War and their dis-
turbing effects).
48. SeeJames T. McClymonds, The Human Right to a Healthy Environment: An Inter-
national Legal Perspective, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 583, 585 n.17, 586 (1992) (noting envi-
ronmental impact of Persian Gulf War on Iraq due to weaponry used by both sides); see
also Feller, supra note 44, at 133-34 (noting large exodus of Iraqis due to Persian Gulf
War). See generally Margaret T. Okordudu-Fubara, Oil in the Persian War: Legal Appraisal
of an Environmental Warfare, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 123 (1991) (lamenting usage of environ-
mental warfare by Iraq during Persian Gulf War and detrimental effects of intentional
oil spills and oil fires).
49. See, e.g., Richard Garfield, Health and Well-Being in Iraq: Sanctions and the Impact
of the Oil-For-Food Program, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 279-82 (2001)
(acknowledging harsh impact of economic sanctions on Iraqi people); Timothy B.
Mills, Reconstructing Iraq: An Analysis of and Proposed Solutions to, the Financing Challenges
Facing Iraqi Small and Mid-Size Businesses, GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 125, 128 (2004) (noting
effects of U.N. sanctions on Iraqi private businesses).
50. See Shara Abraham, Child Soldiers and the Capacity of the Optional Protocol to Protect
Children in Conflict, 10-SPG HUM. RTS. 15 (2003) (lamenting use of child soldiers and
other issues as result of Iran-Iraq and Gulf War); see also George E. Bisharat, Facing
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ronmental effects were, and continue to be, felt by both the
lands and the people inhabiting them."'
The environmental needs of the two States have concerned
the world enough that the United Nations Environment Pro-
gram ("UNEP") has published a detailed post-conflict report on
Afghanistan 52 ("Afghanistan PCA") and a "Desk Study" of the en-
vironment in Iraq ("Iraq Desk Study")."3 The Afghanistan PCA
offers an overview of the Nation's ecology and topography and
how these have been affected by both natural and human-cre-
ated disturbances.5 4 It also highlights the resources present in
Afghanistan and those in need of protection.55  Finally, the Af-
ghanistan PCA details the various governing bodies with environ-
Tyranny with Justice: Alternatives to War in the Confrontationwith Iraq, 7J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 1, 11-40 (2003) (detailing effects of tyrannical regime, Iran-Iraq War, sanctions,
and then-impending Second Gulf War war on Iraqi people).
51. See Andrew C.S. Efaw, United States Refusal to Ban Landmines: The Intersection
Between Tactics, Strategy, Policy, and International Law, 159 MIL. L. REv. 87, 89-94 (1999)
(noting severe effects of landmine usage on environments of Afghanistan and Iraq in-
cluding destruction of endangered species); see also Cohan, supra note 35, at 481 (not-
ing effects of war and weaponry on all aspects of environment); Bruch & Pendergrass,
supra note 42, at 855 (noting need for specific laws protecting environment in peace
and war). Mr. Cohan details the effects of such materiel as oil-burning ships sunk dur-
ing World War II and uranium-depleted rounds used during both Gulf Wars and their
effect on the citizenry after the cessation of armed conflict. See Cohan, supra note 35, at
481 (discussing harmful effects of various weaponry).
52. See U.N. Environment Programme, Afghanistan: Post-Conflict Environmental As-
sessment (2003) [hereinafter Afghanistan PCA], available at http://www.unep.org/Evalu-
ation/PDF/afghanistanpcajanuary2003.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) (describing envi-
ronmental history and present conditions of Afghanistan, noting dire need for environ-
mental intervention, advocating course of action to prevent environmental catastrophe
and also allow Afghan people to use natural resources of country); see also Azimi &
McCauley, supra note 39, at 9-13 (noting need for environmental action to help develop
infrastructure of Afghanistan and protect resources).
53. See U.N. Environment Programme, Desk Study of the Environment in Iraq (Apr.
24, 2003) [hereinafter Iraq Desk Study], available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/publica
tions/IraqDS.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2004) (providing quick overview of environ-
ment in Iraq and its most imminent dangers and needs); see also Frances Williams, UN
Urges Report on Effects of DU, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 8, 2003, at 6 (reporting on U.N.
urging to perform environmental study as quickly as possible once hostilities cease).
54. See Afghanistan PCA, supra note 52, at 6-47 (outlining natural environment of
Afghanistan, urban environmental issues and other human-made effects on environ-
ment); see also Azimi & McCauley, supra note 39, at 9-13 (outlining most imminent
needs of Afghan environment due to lack of conservation and naturally occurring re-
duction of resources).
55. See Afghanistan PCA, supra note 52, at 48-73 (noting findings on status of Af-
ghan natural resources, particularly water, wetlands, forest, and woodland areas in need
of protection); see also Azimi & McCauley, supra note 39, at 9-13 (noting specific actions
required to ensure safe and abundant drinking water and conservation of forests).
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mental responsibilities in the country, applicable international
law, and offers recommendations for how best to protect the Af-
ghan environment.56 The United States has no clear role or re-
sponsibilities specifically enumerated in the Afghanistan PCA,
nor is it called upon to monitor its own government personnel,
military, or corporate contractors in the country.5 7
The Iraq Desk Study is an attempt to identify and address
environmental issues present in that State quickly, rather than
wait for UNEP's full Post-Conflict Assessment that will detail spe-
cific concerns and recommendations in a similar fashion to the
Afghanistan PCA.58 While its scope and accuracy is limited by
UNEP personnel's inability to be on the ground in Iraq during
the most recent conflict,59 it highlights how Iraq's recent surge
in development coupled with ongoing military conflict have
placed a large amount of stress on the environment and infra-
structure.6" Due to political uncertainty in Iraq,61 it is also un-
56. See Afghanistan PCA, supra note 52, at 92-139 (detailing current bodies regulat-
ing Afghan government, status of applicable international law, and recommending de-
tailed environmental management scheme); see also Carlotta Gall, THREATS AND RE-
SPONSES: KABUL; War-Scarred Afghanistan in Environmental Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,
2003, at Al (reporting U.N. concern regarding Afghan environment and need for im-
mediate support to stabilize and protect it).
57. See Afghanistan PCA, supra note 52, at 92-95, 99-100, 104-13 (noting status of
Afghan environmental legislation, advocating international involvement, but not outlin-
ing specific instructions for foreign entities present in Afghanistan); see also Azimi &
McCauley, supra note 39, at 11-16 (noting need for protection of water and other areas
to safeguard Afghan environment).
58. See Iraq Desk Study, supra note 53, at 6-7 (noting past experience dictates quick
response may be critical to preserving environment in post-conflict setting where early
identification of heavily polluted areas can help in immediate clean-up and facilitate
rehabilitation of infrastructure); see generally Afghanistan PCA, supra note 52, at 15-139
(providing detailed outline of Afghan history, topography, environmental needs, and
advocating course of action to best conserve resources of country).
59. See Iraq Desk Study, supra note 53, at 6 (noting United Nations Environment
Program's ("UNEP") inability to do field work due to recent conflict); see also Ian
Fisher, Iraqis Ambush a U.S. Convoy; G.L 's Raid Cell, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/17/international/middleeast/17IRAQ.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2004) (noting violence against foreign entities present in Iraq has yet to
cease).
60. See Iraq Desk Study, supra note 53, at 6-7, 13-15 (noting how population growth,
urban expansion, and long history of military conflict have caused dire conditions in
country); see also Ronald C. Santopadre, Deterioration of Limits on the Use of Force and its
Perils: A Rejection of the Kosovo Precedent, 18 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL COMMENT. 369, 405 n.198
(2003) (lamenting detrimental effects of depleted uranium shells used in both Persian
Gulf Wars).
61. See, e.g., Robin Wright & Mike Allen, Bush to Detail Transition Monday in First of
Several Iraq Speeches, WASH. POST, May 20, 2004, at A18 (quoting U.S. president attempt-
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clear what role foreign Nations, particularly the United King-
dom and the United States, will be expected to play in the envi-
ronmental context.6 2 It is also uncertain how foreign entities
present in the region might cause environmental damage that
affects neighboring Nations (particularly when dealing with
water issues) and cause greater diplomatic and environmental
harm to Iraq.63 What is certain, though, is that the Iraqi environ-
ment has suffered extreme strain from both international con-
flict and internal oppression.6 4
II. JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE RESPONSES BY THE UNITED
STATES TO CITIZEN SUITS IN RESPONSE TO
GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS DETRIMENTAL TO
FOREIGN ENVIRONMENTS
A. Procedural and Statutory Bars to Environmental Suits Against the
United States and Its Agencies
1. The United States' Sovereign Immunity
It is well settled that the U.S. government is immune to suits
for damages unless it explicitly waives its sovereign immunity.6 5
ing to address uncertainty facing Iraqi transition); Bob Deans, C-8 Members Snub U.S.
Appealfor Iraq Troops, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 15, 2004, at A3 (highlighting how un-
certainty of political future of Iraq causing friction among most powerful countries);
Robert Go, Abuse "Sickening and Outrageous", STRAITS TiMES (Singapore), May 11, 2004
(quoting Islamic scholar noting that U.S. exit from Iraq seems undefined and unclear).
62. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora (Continued): Future
Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 803 (2003) (discussing uncertainty over
whether U.N. Security Council Resolutions and actions of United Kingdom and United
States triggered occupation law and its concurrent obligations); Scheffer, supra note 4,
at 843 (detailing obligations placed on United Kingdom and United States if occupa-
tion law triggered by their actions as result of most recent conflict in Iraq).
63. See generally Kanchana Wangkeo, Monumental Challenges: The Lawfulness of De-
stroying Cultural Heritage During Peacetime, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 183, 237 (2003) (recalling
that Turkey's attempt to build Ilisu Dam would possibly have caused water war between
Iraq and Syria); Peggy Kozal, Is the Continued Use of Sanctions as Implemented Against Iraq a
Violation of International Human Rights, 28 DENV. J. IrNT'L L & POL'y 383, 391 (2000)
(noting how over-pumping of wells causes oil spillage detrimental to environment).
64. See Iraq Desk Study, supra note 53, at 6-7, 92-100 (noting extreme pressures
placed on Iraqi environment and infrastructure); see also Aaron Schwabach, Ecocide and
Genocide in Iraq: International Law, the Marsh Arabs, and Environmental Damage in Non-
International Conflicts, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. 1, 1-3 (2004) (highlighting that Iraq
has suffered environmentally as much, if not more than, any other Nation in recent
years due to both international conflicts and internal crackdowns by Saddam Hussein
on southern marshland regions).
65. See, e.g., Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992) (holding that any waiver by federal government
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Environmental legislation, however, has usually contained lan-
guage indicating an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity in the
context of coercive actions for monetary damages and an injunc-
tion for prospective behavior.66 Some international law, includ-
ing the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, contains a possi-
ble waiver of individual States' sovereign immunity in very spe-
cific instances, such as damage caused by military aircraft.6 7
The general trend, however, in both the U.S. Congress and
U.S. courts is to expand rather than contract the scope of sover-
eign immunity for both the U.S. government and non-U.S. gov-
ernments.6" Some scholars, however, have argued that sovereign
of its sovereign immunity must be stated in language of statute unequivocally); United
States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995) (holding that waiver of sovereign immunity
by federal government must be unambiguous and any ambiguity in language of statute
interpreted in favor of sovereign); City of Jacksonville v. Dep't of the Navy, 348 F.3d
1307, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that Clean Air Act's citizen suit provisions do
not expose federal government to punitive damages as no explicit waiver of sovereign
immunity made in that regard). But see Maj. Cotell, USA, 1999-JUN ARMY LAw. 40
(1999) (noting that U.S. States incorrectly assume they cannot regulate federal installa-
tions under Clean Air Act when sovereign immunity invoked and believe their only
recourse is to withhold permits); Randall S. Abate & Carolyn H. Cogswell, Sovereign
Immunity and Citizen Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws: A Proposal for a New Synthe-
sis, 15 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 1, 12-16 (construing United States Dept. of Energy v. Ohio, 503
U.S. 607 (1992)) (noting lower courts's reticence to apply Ohio Court's decision to pre-
vent punitive damages under environmental actions due to sovereign immunity).
66. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1992) (granting citizens right of
action against federal government to enforce violations including financial penalties);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1992) (granting citizens right to sue and waiving
U.S. sovereign liability for civil penalties imposed by either State or federal court if
found to be in violation); Crowley Marine Servs. v. FEDNAV, Ltd., 915 Supp. 218, 222-
24 (1995) (noting 1992 amendments passed by Congress made sovereign immunity
waiver in domestic environmental context even clearer in regards to coercive damages).
67. See U.N. Conv. on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, art. 263,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (stating liability of Nations for environmental harm by
military aircraft); see also Michel Bourbonniere & Louis Haeck, Military Aircraft and Inter-
national Law: Chicago Opus 3, 66J. AiR L. & COM. 885, 962-63 (2001) (noting Article 236
of U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea's sovereign immunity provision does not
preclude State liability from damage caused to marine environments even by military
aircraft). But see Bernard H. Oxman, Transit of Straits and Archipelagic Waters by Military
Aircraft, 4 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 377, 410 (2000) (noting ability of states to enforce
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea provisions limited to ships not protected by
sovereign immunity).
68. See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1606 (2004)
(granting immunity to all non-U.S. States, agencies, and officers); 18 U.S.C. § 2337 (1)
& (2) (2002) (stating no action shall accrue against United States, its agencies or of-
ficers, or foreign States or its agencies and officers under its provisions); Macharia v.
United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding claims of violation of Kenyan
Constitution barred due to sovereign immunity as no claim of violation of customary
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immunity should be the exception rather than the rule, particu-
larly in the international context.
69
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") contains
specific carve-out exceptions that allow for suits for extraterrito-
rial actions committed by non-U.S. States and their agents if
those actions affect the United States.7" The immunity granted
by FSLA is usually not extended to corporations acting as State
agents or to State actors under the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA") or Alien Tort Statute ("ATS").71
2. The Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application
of U.S. Law
The longstanding default rule in U.S. law is that federal stat-
utes apply only to actions occurring in the United States and do
not have extraterritorial application.72 The U.S. Supreme Court
international law alleged); Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204 (S.D.
Fla. 2002) (holding claim of violation of international law violations against United
States not valid as Congress has not explicitly waived sovereign immunity).
69. See, e.g., Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, andJus Cogens: A Critique
of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 741, 757 (2003) (arguing that sover-
eign immunity is exception to jurisdiction not vice-versa); Rosalyn Higgins, Certain Un-
resolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 265, 271 (1982) (advo-
cating restrictive view of sovereign immunity); Scott Grosscup, The Trial of Slobodan
Milosevic: The Demise of Head of State Immunity and the Specter of Victor'sJustice, 32 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 355, 364-65 (2004) (using case of criminal trial of Slobodan Milosevic
to eliminate erosion of sovereign immunity in international context).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2004) (providing specific exceptions for liability
under its provisions including any commercial activity taken by U.S. State having direct
effect on United States); see also McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 271
F.3d 1101, 1105-07 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (highlighting exception granted in Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act ("FSIA") and holding exception grants federal jurisdiction); Brad
J. Kisserman, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational Corporate Responsibility by
Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH. U.L. REv. 881, 908-09 (1999) (noting out-
lined exceptions granting jurisdiction over non-U.S. Nations and their agents under
FSIA).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519-20 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(finding no immunity when actions were taken by officials in government not recog-
nized by United States); Hilao v. Marcos 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (grantingjurisdic-
tion when non-U.S. State waives immunity), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Gregory
G.A. Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational Corporations,
30 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 359, 374-76 (1999) (noting limitations on sovereign
immunity granted to non-U.S. States and corporations when suit arises under Alien
Tort Claims Act ("ATCA")).
72. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting
that it is long-standing principle of U.S. law that Congressional legislation does not
apply extraterritorially unless stated and purpose of this default interpretation is to pre-
vent unintended conflicts with other Nations' laws (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
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has demonstrated a willingness to expand this doctrine (much
like that of sovereign immunity) and restrict the prospective
scope of U.S. law abroad.73 These restrictions are also problem-
atic with the ATCA, as one cannot sue the United States unless it
has specifically waived sovereign immunity.74
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain75 makes clear that any tort committed by the United
States or its agents on non-U.S. soil is not actionable in a U.S.
court.76 The Court left open, however, the ability of Congress to
cional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963))); William S. Dodge, Un-
derstanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 85, 85-88
(1998) (noting rise in application by U.S. Supreme Court of extraterritorial presump-
tion, even to legislation Congress seemingly intended to have extraterritorial applica-
tion).
73. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (stating explicit waiver of sov-
ereign immunity does not apply to any claim stemming from actions that occurred
abroad); see also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-05 (1993) (holding Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") does not have application for tort committed in Antarctica
even though that continent is not sovereign Nation). The Smith holding is particularly
instructive in the case of Iraq as it remains unclear at this point what law applies to that
Nation and what body or bodies govern the country. See, e.g., Richard Whittle, 20,000
Troops Given Extended Tour in Iraq: Some Have Already Left and Will Be Forced to Return at
Least 90 days, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 16, 2004, at 22A (quoting U.S. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld as saying that road to democracy and security in Iraq is un-
certain one); Tony Walker, High Risks in Iraq, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Mar. 31, 2004, at 61
(noting future of Iraqi government system, elections, and security remain uncertain);
John F. Burns, The Reach of War: The Occupation; Drawing From Its Past Wars, Britain Takes
a Tempered Approach to Iraqi Insurgency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2004, at A8 (noting uncer-
tainty of Iraqi future and if functional government will exist in near future). Compare
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1606 (2000) (granting immunity
to sovereign Nations, officers, and agents for actions within United States and else-
where), with Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 433-37
(1989) (holding FSIA does not have extraterritorial application).
74. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (granting right of action for
non-U.S. citizens in U.S. courts for torts committed in violation of U.S. treaty or interna-
tional law); see also Tzeutschler, supra note 71, at 376-77 (discussing ATCA's provisions
effect on extraterritoriality concerns).
75. 124 S. Ct. 2739, 72 U.S.L.W. 4660 (U.S. June 29, 2004), reversing 331 F.3d 604
(9th Cir. 2003). See David L. Hudson, Jr., "Door Ajar"for Foreigners' Human Rights Suits, 3
No. 26 A.B.A.J. E-REPoRT 3 (July 2, 2004) (analyzing Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain and discussing implications of decision on future plaintiffs).
76. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000) (stating waiver of sov-
ereign immunity does not apply to actions arising in non-U.S. country); see also Sosa, 124
S. Ct. at 2748 (highlighting foreign soil exception specifically defined in FTCA);
George Costello, Supreme Court Update, 51-AUG FED. LAw. 41, 55-56 (2004) (discussing
Court's decision in Sosa and noting Court's citation of non-extraterritorial nature of
waiver in FTCA); Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of
Sovereign Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 8 (2003)
(discussing service members' inability to sue U.S. government for actions arising on
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confer a right of action upon non-U.S. citizens through appro-
priate legislation. 7 The decision weakens ATCA as Justice Sou-
ter's opinion confines the types of suits allowed under ATCA to
piracy, assaults on diplomats or prevention of safe conduct, and
torture.78 The ability of a non-U.S. citizen to sue a U.S. corpora-
tion or to sue for egregious violations of international law re-
mains unclear.7 9
Afghan and Iraqi citizens affected by U.S. government or
corporate environmental malfeasance might also gain access to
U.S. courts should the United States become party to an interna-
tional environmental treaty by relying on the Charming Betsy doc-
trine.8 " Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, decided in 1804,
gave Justice Marshall the opportunity to establish that U.S. law
should always be interpreted to conform to international law
and treaties."' Thus, an international environmental treaty craft-
non-U.S. soil due to FTCA's explicit language deeming extraterritorial acts outside its
waiver).
77. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 1249-51 (discussing ATCA's nature as grant ofjurisdiction
not right of action and necessity of legislation granting such cause of action before non-
U.S. citizens may bring extraterritorial case in U.S. courts); see also Patrick D. Curran,
Universalism, Relativism, and Private Enforcement of Customary International Law, 5 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 311, 314 (2004) (discussing U.S. cases where courts held ATCA as purely juris-
dictional statute not granting cause of action).
78. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 1250-54 (holding rights of action under ATCA limited to
piracy, diplomatic infringement, and torture); see also Hudson, supra note 75, at 3 (ana-
lyzing holding of Sosa and commenting that holding restricted possibility of rights of
action but left open torture and ability to sue U.S. corporations).
79. See Hudson, supra note 75, at 3 (discussing viability of suits against corpora-
tions unclear in wake of Sosa decision and potential for expansion of actionable of-
fenses under Alien Tort Statute ("ATS")); see also Thomas M. Keck, Supreme Court splits:
Conservative Justices Often Disagree, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Aug. 8, 2004, atJ5 (comment-
ing on Sosa decision and concurrences and noting Court's holding that Congressional
enabling legislation not required for action under some violations of international law).
80. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(Marshall, J.) (stating that "Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate...
law of [N]ations if any other possible construction remains"); see also Harold Hongju
Koh, AGORA: THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW In-
ternational Law as Part of OurLaw, 98 AM.J. INT'L L. 43, 44-46 (2004) (stating that Charm-
ing Betsy doctrine is one of earliest examples of internalization of international law into
U.S. law); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitu-
tionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 91, 99-
100 (2004) (noting how doctrine of Charming Betsy informs courts to strike down U.S.
federal legislation if it contravenes international law).
81. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118 (holding that U.S. law should be interpreted to
coalesce with international law if at all possible); see also Detlev F. Vagts, The United States
and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM.J. Ir'L L. 313, 322-25 (2001) (noting long
history of Charming Betsy doctrine, its application in various case law, and recent expan-
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ing a private right of action for citizens might supercede any U.S.
legal impediments to suing for environmental harm done by ei-
ther the U.S. government or U.S. corporations.8 2
B. Brief History of Environmental Legislation in the United States
and Its Application Both Domestically and Internationally
After the various comprehensive environmental legislation
packages passed in the 1970's,s" it remained unclear what role
the private citizenry or NGOs 8 4 played in their enforcement. s5
Similarly, as the United States increased its participation in inter-
national environmental agreements, it was also not understood
if any private right to sue or enforce existed. 6
sion and contraction of its scope in U.S. case law); Ralph G. Steinhardt, International
Humanitarian Law in the Courts of the United States: Yamashita, Filartiga, and 9/11, 36 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2004) (discussing desire of U.S. executive and legislative
branches to follow international law under Charming Betsy doctrine, but lamenting diffi-
culty of applying international law successfully in U.S. courts).
82. See Koh, supra note 80, at 4446 (discussing application of Charming Betsy doc-
trine in U.S. history as default rule acknowledging U.S. law should be interpreted as
comporting to international law); see also Kevin P. Cummins, Trade Secrets: How the
Charming Betsy Canon May Do More to Weaken U.S. Environmental Laws Than the WTO's
Trade Rules, 12 FORDHAM ENvrL. L.J. 141, 195 n.232 (2000) (reviewing Charming Betsy
doctrine's historical application and modification by courts and quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1987) which memorializes
doctrine).
83. See Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1006-07, 1026-27 (detailing environmental legisla-
tion passed during Nixon administration); see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., Executive
Ordes and Presidential Commands: Presidents Riding to the Rescue of the Environment, 21 J.
LAND RESOURCES & EN-VTL. L. 13, 21 (2001) (noting President Nixon's place in U.S.
history as one of top environmental presidents for legislation passed and implemented
during his administration).
84. See Marissa A. Pagnani, Environmental NGOs and the Fate of the Traditional Nation-
State, 15 GEO. INT'L ENvrL. L. REv. 791, 800 (2003) (noting refusal by States to allow
NGOs at bargaining table when discussing international environmental issues); see also
Charles Qiong Wu, A Unified Forum? The New Arbitration Rules for Environmental Disputes
Under the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 3 CHI.J. INT'L L. 263, 264 (2002) (noting impor-
tance of NGO involvement in international environmental controversies but long stand-
ing tenet of international law that only State actors can participate in process); Peggy
Rodgers Kalas, International Environmental Dispute Resolution and the Need for Access By Non-
State Entities, 12 COLO. J. INr'L ENvrL. L. & PoL'Y 191, 195 (2001) (urging NGOs be
given greater latitude to bring environmental suits).
85. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (reversing
appellate court decision not to allow standing for citizen group brought against violator
of Clean Water Act). But see Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d
353 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that private group may not bring citizen suit under Clean
Water Act).
86. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding plaintiffs
lacked standing as private citizens under Endangered Species Act for U.S. government
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Further, as discussed above," the track record of U.S. diplo-
macy in the realm of international environmental affairs is spotty
at best. There are four basic ways that citizens can attempt ei-
ther to enjoin U.S. government environmental action abroad or
compel the government to adhere to established regulations and
agreements: (1) private citizen or NGO suit under U.S. federal
law;88 (2) private citizen or NGO suit under international law89
or one seeking to compel compliance with a treaty9° or agree-
ment that the United States is party to; (3) suit by a non-U.S.
national9' against the United States under a recognized treaty or
against a U.S. corporation under ATCA; or (4) a qui tam9 2 action
actions and funding abroad even when harm is specific); see also Wu, supra note 84, at
264 (noting traditional bar of non-States, i.e., individuals or NGOs from bringing inter-
national environmental actions).
87. See Blomquist, supra note 32, at 495 (reciting U.S. failures to ratify or sign
prominent international environmental legislation); see also Henkin, supra note 32, at
208 (highlighting U.S. absence from environmental treaties, notably Kyoto Protocol);
Lazarus, supra note 16, at 1000 (calling to attention recent reversals in environmental
policy by current Bush administration).
88. See Mary Elliott Rolle, Unraveling Accountability: Contesting Legal and Procedural
Barriers in International Toxic Tort Cases, 15 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L. REv. 135, 138-42 (2003)
(pointing out domestic legislation in place in most developed countries including
United States and evidentiary and procedural barriers to successful claims); see also Bar-
ton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Mon-
tana's Environmental Provisions, 64 Mor. L. REv. 157, 185 (2003) (discussing that with-
out valid citizen suits and implementing legislation there remains limited recourse for
private citizens to ensure environmental protection).
89. See Kenneth F. McCallion, International Environmental Justice: Rights and Rem-
dies, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 427, 433 (2003) (noting International Court of
Justice's ("ICJ") jurisdiction over international environmental issues but inability for
private citizens or NGOs to gain access or standing as only recognized States may bring
actions in front of this tribunal); see also Blomquist, supra note 32, at 495 (noting U.S.
failure to ratify international environmental treaties which might be basis for enforce-
ment actions).
90. See Henry W. McGee, Jr. & Timothy W. Woolsey, Transboundary Dispute Resolu-
tion as a Process and Access to Justice for Private Litigants: Commentaries on Cesare Romano's
The Peaceful Settlement of International Environmental Disputes: A Pragmatic Approach (2000),
20 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 109, 116 (2002) (discussing that while non-State parties
are not often granted standing, number of international bodies that do give standing to
non-State parties has increased). But see Ehrmann, supra note 18, at 378 (noting U.S.
failure to join, sign, or enforce various environmental treaties).
91. See Kalas, supra note 84, at 195 (noting non-U.S. citizens have attempted to
bring suit for international environmental issues but are usually denied standing); see
also Rolle, supra note 88 at 138-40 (noting procedural and other non-substantive barri-
ers used to block international environmental suits).
92. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1986) (granting standing and portion
of recovered monies to any individual bringing claim that party defrauded U.S. govern-
ment); see also Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 77 (2002) (advocat-
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alleging fraudulent or illegal action by a party that costs the
United States financially.
1. Private Rights of Action Under Established
U.S. Federal Law
Several pieces of environmental legislation seemingly grant
wide-sweeping standing, including the Endangered Species Act
and Clean Water Act.9" In fact, Congress explicitly enumerated
three types of rights of action available to private citizens under
its environmental legislation: (1) "private attorney general"94
suits; (2) "deadline suits"95 mandating that officials perform
their duties; and (3) judicial review suits which seek judgment
on the legality of agency actions.96
In international actions brought by U.S. citizens, each
method has been used, but none with any great degree of suc-
cess at achieving the goal of environmental protection.97 The
ing allowance of qui tam actions for environmental causes of action). The False Claims
Act ("FCA") seems to grant a wide-sweeping class of potential plaintiffs a right of action,
but contains specific substantive and procedural limitations. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a) (7) (A)-(C) (noting relator must satisfy specific obligations as far as govern-
ment cooperation and timeliness of claim).
93. See Endangered Species Act § 11 (g), 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2000) (authorizing citi-
zen suits against person in violation of Act and against Secretary of Interior for failure
to perform nondiscretionary duty); see also Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) &
(2) (2000) (authorizing citizen suits against individuals, corporations, or governments,
within scope of Eleventh Amendment, under its provisions provided that no indepen-
dent government action has been taken against party).
94. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 996 (explaining citizen's role in this con-
text is to "supplement government enforcement"); see also David R. Hodas, Standing and
Climate Change: Can Anyone Complain About the Weather?, 9J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'y 451,
460-62 (2000) (recalling rise in private attorney general suits during Reagan administra-
tion in response to reduction in environmental legislation and enforcement).
95. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 996 (commenting that these types of suits
"typically challenge an agency's failure to meet a statutory deadline to take some ac-
tion"); see also David Schoenbrod, Environmental Law and Growing Up, 6 YALE J. ON REG.
357, 363 (1989) (reporting usage of deadline suits as easy way to call courts' attention to
failures of EPA).
96. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 10, at 997 (highlighting that these provisions
intend to supplement Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000), which
grants similar rights of action); see also Adam Babich, The Wages of Sin: The Violator-Pays
Rule for Environmental Citizen Suits, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 219, 222-24 (2003) (notingjudi-
cial review of agency actions can have quick effects on environment and public health
when brought by citizens).
97. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding citizen group
bringing judicial review suit did not have standing as plaintiffs could not demonstrate
particularized harm, traceability of defendant's action to that harm, and redressability
of harm if decision favorable; and case was unripe); Public Citizen v. Office of U.S.
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requirement of a particularized harm traceable to alleged action
of defendant and redressability in response to a favorable deci-
sion strictly enumerated in Lujan,9 8 makes these types of cases99
unlikely to be favored by anyone seeking to protect the environ-
ments of Afghanistan and Iraq.1"'
Further, before the stringent standing requirements enu-
merated by Lujan, the Court had articulated in Gwaltney of Smith-
field, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation that citizens must demon-
strate that the harm caused was ongoing and not simply a past
injury."' In that instance, however, the U.S. Congress had re-
Trade Rep., 782 F. Supp. 139 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding environmental organization
lacked standing to compel Office of U.S. Trade Rep. to prepare environmental impact
statements for proposed foreign trade agreements). It was precisely this type of review
that President Clinton committed to in Executive Order 13,141: an order that has
never been enforced. See Salzman, supra note 22, at 503 (noting much-heralded Execu-
tive Order 13,141 never actually enforced when trade agreements failed to contain envi-
ronmental assessment). A case involving U.S. Naval actions in international waters that
sought both prospective relief, to enjoin the use of sonar devices in a particular context,
and clarification of the legality of the actions and the Navy's compliance efforts met
with mixed results. See Nat. Resources Def. Council Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 2002 WL
32095131, at *7-*16 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (order granting partial summary judgment). The
Court held that plaintiffs did have standing, but that the program in question was sub-
ject to neither NEPA or EPA review. See id. at *7-*16, 23.
98. 504 U.S. at 573-75 (holding that neither claim of future harm or supposed
procedural harm grant standing, show traceability and causation, or provide redres-
sability). See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)
(citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Oranization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976))
(noting redressability requirement outlined as part of Article III standing requirements
in previous cases and holding that when only benefit for favorable ruling is satisfaction
and monies paid to U.S. Treasury and not to plaintiff, no standing exists); see also Cas-
sandra Stubbs, Is the Environmental Citizen Suit Dead? An Examination of the Erosion of
Standards ofJusticiability for Environmental Citizen Suits, 26 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
77, 82-83 (2001) (noting erosion of citizen suits enforcing environmental regulations
due to Lujan decision and its stringent standing requirements).
99. See Ekundayo B. George, Whose Line in the Sand: Can Environmental Protection
and National Security Coexist, and Should the Government Be Held Liable for Not Attaining This
Goal?, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 651, 700-05 (2003) (noting difficulty
balancing environmental obligations with national security in international context).
100. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt, Taking Supplies to the Troops, "Coming in High and Fast",
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2003, at A15 (noting that air travel to Iraq is still extremely danger-
ous, even for military aircraft); Carlotta Gall & John H. Cushman,Jr., Coalition Strike in
Afghanistan Kills 9 Children, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at Al (reporting accidental bomb-
ing of civilian children by coalition air forces).
101. See Gwalmey of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49,
51 (1987) (vacating and remanding case as no good-faith allegation of ongoing harm
alleged in proceedings below); see also Stubbs, supra note 98, at 84-86 (noting Court's
decision in Gwaltney resulted in uncertainty over when an environmental injury was
"ongoing" as opposed to "past" and ambiguity caused both sides to see holding as
favorable).
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sponded by altering the Clean Air Act to specifically give private
citizens a right of action against any person, business, or govern-
ment entity.'1
2
A few academics have suggested a somewhat more novel ap-
proach at circumventing these bars to citizens gaining standing
in environmental actions; they advocate interpreting the U.S.
Constitution's equitable grants't 3 of rights of action as providing
current standing for harm done to future generations. 10 4 How-
ever, this strategy has met with little success. 10 5
2. Private Rights of Action Seeking U.S. Government
Mandated Compliance with International
Agreements and Treaties
The Respondent in the seminal Lujan case unsuccessfully
raised the question of whether a private citizen could seek en-
forcement of a treaty to which the United States is a party by U.S.
officials,'0 6 but to no avail. The issue for any party seeking en-
102. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1990) (granting
general right of action to citizens for enforcement of Act); see also Roger A. Greenbaum
& Anne S. Peterson, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Citizen Suits and How They
Work, 2 FouaDAm ENVrL. L. REP. 79, 99-100 (1991) (noting how Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990 seemed to address issues raised by Gwaltney and sought to expand ability
of citizens to bring suit).
103. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 (providing that 'judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. .. ).
104. SeeJohn Edward Davidson, Tomorrow's Standing Today: How the Equitable Juris-
diction Clause of Article III, Section 2 Confers Standing Upon Future Generations, 28 COLUM. J.
EN rL. L. 185 (2003) (arguing for standing in equitable claims for material harm done
to environment affecting unborn persons); see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Environmental Ethics
and Our Moral Relationship to Future Generations: Future Rights and Present Virtue, 24
COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 249 (1999) (advocating protection of environment for future gen-
erations as moral obligation that should be supported by law).
105. See Davidson, supra note 104, at 195 n.24 (citing Ted Allen, The Philippine
Children's Case: Recognizing Legal Standing for Future Generations, 6 GEO. INT'L ENVrL. L.
REv. 713, 732 (1994)) (noting proper procedural mechanism required for assertion of
rights of future generations); see also Daniel B. Gatmaytan, The Illusion of Intergenerational
Equity: OPOSA v. Factoran as Pyrrhic Victory, 15 GEO. INT'L ENvrL. L. REv. 457, 458-60
(2003) (noting case most relied upon for intergenerational equity as premise for stand-
ing only mentions future generations as dicta and other courts have held this premise
invalid).
106. See Brief for Respondent at 3-4, 19-20, 24, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992) (No. 90-1424), available at 1991 WL 577004 (citing Convention on In-
ternational Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and various Execu-
tive Orders to bolster claim that U.S. government can not promote actions that endan-
ger species and that citizens had right to enjoin such actions).
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forcement of an international environmental treaty is first
whether it is self-effectuating,' and, if not, whether Congress
has granted a specific right of action for private citizens under its
terms.'° 8
Thus, the standing issue becomes virtually identical to that
discussed above. Namely, does Congress grant a specific right of
action and does the instant plaintiff have the necessary particu-
larized harm and injury-in-fact?0 9 The only difference here is
that the source of the law will have a broader scope as it is an
instrument of international law and not U.S. law, making it more
useful in the Afghan-Iraqi context. This distinction might prove
useful in aiding a potential plaintiff in circumventing the sover-
eign immunity"o and extraterritoriality issues."'
3. Suits by Non-U.S. Nationals for Actions Committed Abroad
by U.S. Government Contractors and U.S. Corporations
Several avenues exist by which non-U.S. nationals could, at
107. See United States v. Rauschler, 119 U.S. 408, 418 (holding that treaties made
by U.S. government are U.S. law but require legislative implementation); see also Elisa-
beth M. McOmber, Problems in Enforcement of the Convention On International Trade in
Endangered Species, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 673, 689-90 (2002) (noting difficulties of inter-
national environmental treaties caused by vagueness in drafting which leads to discrep-
ancies in U.S. implementation, reducing overall efficacy of treaty).
108. See Rauschler, 119 U.S. at 418 (noting implications in U.S. of ratified treaties);
see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555 (noting no private right of action created and particular-
ized harm required under Endangered Species Act).
109. See generally Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 167 (noting that when instant plaintiff has
demonstrated injury that is traceable and redressable, Article III standing requirements
are satisfied); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555 (holding no standing for injury to environ-
ment when plaintiff herself has no demonstrable injury-in-fact).
110. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1992) (granting citizens right
of action against federal government to enforce violations including financial penal-
ties); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1992) (granting citizens right to sue and waiv-
ing U.S. sovereign liability for civil penalties imposed by either State or federal court if
found to be in violation); Crowley Marine Servs. v. FEDNAV, Ltd., 915 Supp. 218, 222-
24 (1995) (noting 1992 amendments passed by Congress made sovereign immunity
waiver in U.S. environmental context even clearer in regards to coercive damages).
111. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting that
it is long-standing principle of U.S. law that Congressional legislation does not apply
outside of United States unless explicitly stated and purpose of this interpretation is to
avoid unintended conflicts with other Nations' laws (quoting McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963))); see also William S.
Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERuELEYJ. INT'L L. 85,
85-88 (1998) (noting rise in application by U.S. Supreme Court of extraterritoriality
principle, even to legislation that Congress seemingly intended to have application
outside of United States).
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least theoretically, seek either an injunction or compensation for
environmental damage done by U.S. government contractors or
corporations in Afghanistan or Iraq.' 12  The most promising
method seems to be actions against U.S. corporations contracted
by the government through ATCA.'"3
ATCA" 4 has been an underutilized right of action that
dates back to the Judiciary Act of 1789."' Plaintiffs must satisfy
three elements for a successful ATCA claim: "(1) they are aliens,
(2) they are suing for a tort, and (3) the tort violates the 'law of
Nations.""' 6  The third element is what makes environmental
claims under the ATCA most difficult as there is no clear inter-
national or customary law directly preserving the right to a
healthy environment.' 7
112. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (granting right of action
for non-U.S. citizens in U.S. courts for torts committed in violation of U.S. treaty or
international law); see also Kalas, supra note 84, at 195 (noting non-U.S. citizens have
attempted to bring suit for international environmental issues but are usually denied
standing).
113. See generally Natalie L. Bridgeman, Human Rights Litigation Under ATCA as a
Proxy for Environmental Claims, 6 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEv. L.J. 1 (2003) (noting potential
successful actions against U.S. corporations available under ATCA). But see Lucinda
Saunders, Rich and Rare Are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers Accountable for Trading
Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1402, 1451-53, 1453 n.248 (citing Laura Bower-
sett, Doe v. Unocal: Tortuous Decision for Multinationals Doing Business in Politically Unstable
Enviroments, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 361, 375-79 (1998)) (noting impediments for non-U.S.
plaintiffs seeking to bring ATCA action including high factual standard and multi-na-
tional corporations' ability to invoke forum non conveniens).
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (providing that "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of [N]ations or a treaty of the United States.")
115. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (1980) (noting ATCA is
"rarely invoked" provision); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor Stan-
dards: The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 203, 211-14
(2004) (noting historical usages of ATCA and advocating its application to fair labor
standards); Bridgeman, supra note 113, at 4 (relating history of ATCA and its only re-
cent widespread usage).
116. See Bridgeman, supra note 113, at 5, n.21 (noting that Second, Fifth, Ninth
Circuits have affirmed dual nature of ATCA as granting both jurisdiction and substan-
tive cause of action); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
28 U.S.C. § 1350 grants federal subject matter jurisdiction when three elements: (1)
alien sues; (2) for tort; and (3) committed in violation of law of Nations; are satisfied);
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. La. 1997) (noting cur-
rent view of § 1350 is that it grants federal cause of action and federal forum), affd 197
F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation,
25 F.3d 1467, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting § 1350 does not require action "arise
under" law of Nations but violation must be of norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory).
117. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 383 (holding treaties cited by plaintiffs inadequate
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The "right to a healthy environment,""' 8 while recognized
as important to human growth and development, 1 9 has not
been codified by the United Nations nor has it been part of a
treaty implemented by the United States.1 20 Further, the few in-
ternational environmental agreements 121 that have received any
widespread support require each Nation to implement valid leg-
islation, as the treaties and agreements are not self-executing.122
as demonstrations that alleged actions by defendant violated international law); see also
Sarah C. Rispin, Litigating Foreign Environmental Claims in U.S. Courts: The Impact of Flores
v. Southern Peru Copper Corporation, [2004] 34 ENVrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,097
(noting difficulty for plaintiffs to find documented international law violated by corpo-
rations in environmental cases).
118. See John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right
to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customay International Law, 25 COLUM. J. ENvrL.
L. 283 (2000) (advocating healthy environment as "well-defined right"); see also Rispin,
supra note 117, at 10,097 (noting difficulty of environmental claims under ATCA as no
traditional right to healthy environment exists); Bridgeman, supra note 113, at 6 (not-
ing that narrower view of international law to ATCA environmental claims is that no
customary environmental law is seen as sufficient to be actionable).
119. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/
Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (declaring that healthy environment is right
that should be protected and memorialized in international law); see also Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, arts. 52(2), 57(2) (b), U.N. Doc. A/32/144,
Annex 1 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1414, 1416 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]
(expressing sentiment that even in times of warfare environment's protection should be
priority); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAw OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2004) (noting obligations of international law for warring
Nations, including protection of environment and discussing recent conflicts in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq); Christopher H. Lytton, America's Borders and Civil Liberties in a Post-
September 11th World, 12 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 197, 214 n.82-83 (2003); Neil A.F.
Popovic, Humanitarian Law, Protection of the Environment, and Human Rights, 8 GEO. INT'L
ENVFL. L. REv. 67, 72 (1995) (citing Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 and Hague Convention (IV) Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 Oct. 1907, 36 Stat. 2227 [hereinafter Hague
Conventions]) (noting Hague Conventions call for preservation of "human life," its
culture, and "historical environment").
120. See Henkin, supra note 32, at 205 (noting U.S. decision not to ratify Kyoto and
other environmental treaties). But see Nicholas A. Robinson, Enforcing Environmental
Norms: Diplomatic andJudicial Approaches, 26 HASTINGS IW'L & COMP. L. REV. 387, 391-94
(2003) (noting U.N. Conferences on Earth, Development, and rising cognizance of
global environmental issues).
121. See Robinson, supra note 120, at 397 (discussing some successful multilateral
environmental agreements, e.g., U.N. Convention on Law of Sea); see also Bela A. Gary,
Book Review, 18 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 227, 230 (1994) (reviewing C. FORD RUNGE,
FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL INTERESTS (Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1994)) (noting Montreal
Protocol successful international agreement because of gradual implementation).
122. See Robinson, supra note 120, at 397 (noting that many environmental agree-
ments require implementing legislation by individual Nations even after treaties with
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In fact, one of the most frustrating aspects of international law is
the uncertainty of what is widely accepted transnationally and
what is not. 12 ' Thus, even if the premise that a healthy environ-
ment is a right guaranteed to all,1 24 the question of how to im-
plement protections of that right both nationally and interna-
tionally persists. 21
Another hurdle the plaintiff must face is the political ques-
tion issue. 1 26  The Supreme Court has held that if the issue
widespread effect signed); see also Irina 0. Krasnova, Post-Rio Treaties: Implementation
Challenges, 13 PACE ENrL. L. REv. 97, 102 n.18 (1995) (construing Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for the Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat Desertifica-
tion in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Af-
rica, U.N. Doc. A/AC.241/15/Rev. 7 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1328 (1994)) (noting
difficulties international environmental agreements face as they require both collabora-
tion and implementation).
123. See Robert M. Augst, Environmental Damage Resulting from Operation Enduring
Freedom: Violations of International Law?, [2003] 33 ENVrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,668
(highlighting varied application of international law that specifically addresses ques-
tions about U.S. methods in its Afghan operations (Operation Enduring Freedom) and
focusing on U.S. decision to use cluster bombs, depleted uranium munitions, and
targeting potentially environmentally sensitive sites). The arguments gain some trac-
tion through a rigid application of the Geneva Conventions as they apply to the envi-
ronment during warfare. See Protocol I, supra note 119 (detailing requirements of war-
ring parties to attempt to preserve environment). Further, there is evidence that U.S.
usage of unjustifiable environmentally-hazardous materiel is not the first time the Af-
ghan ecosystem has had to endure this type of ordinance. See Timothy K. Gilman,
Search, Sentence, and (Don't) Sell: Combating the Threat of Biological Weapons Through Inspec-
tions, Criminalization, and Restrictions on Equipment, 12J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'v 217, 225-
26 (2003) (noting use by Soviet forces of biological weapons on Afghan soldiers during
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).
124. See Rio Declaration, supra note 119 (declaring that all share right to healthy
environment); see also Protocol I, supra note 119 (noting obligations of occupying pow-
ers to ensure protection of local environment).
125. See Robinson, supra note 120, at 387-92 (noting U.N. Conferences dealing
with international environmental issues but their lack of widespread enforcement on
either international level through ICJ or national level through implementation of valid
legislation); see also Krasnova, supra note 122, at 102 (calling to attention difficulty of
national implementation of lofty ideals memorialized in many environmental treaties).
126. See, e.g., Lyndsy Rutherford, Redressing U.S. Corporate Environmental Harms
Abroad Through Transnational Public Law Litigation: Generating a Global Discourse on the
International Definition of Environmental Justice, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 807, 817-18
(2002) (noting U.S. courts must decide if issue at stake in litigation is best suited for
another branch of government); Harold Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100
YALE L.J. 2347, 2386 (1991) (noting judges should ask if Constitution has committed
another branch to resolving complaint presented in ATCA claim or if courts are best
suited). However, most of the questions that arise in an ATCA claim are common law
issues or issues of interpretation that are solely within the realm of the courts to decide.
SeeJapan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (holding
that interpretation of ambiguities in both international treaties and Congressional stat-
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before a court is a political one that is constitutionally commit-
ted to another branch, or is not justiciable because of potential
embarrassment and lack of respect or deference given to an-
other branch, that court does not have jurisdiction. 127  Further,
if the issue is deemed one of foreign relations between the
United States and another country, it is considered a political
question reserved for the executive and legislative branches. 128
Commentators have argued that aspects of environmental law
are political questions best left to the legislature and beyond the
scope of judicial interpretation. 129
The ATCA is commonly used as a basis for civil actions
against U.S. companies for torts committed abroad. ° It is not
utes is task for federal courts); see alsoJones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32 (1899) (holding
interpretation of treaties solely within purview of courts unless issue is entirely political
and Congress has no power to determine rights under treaties); Koh, supra, at 2387
(noting political question issue only is addressed when no international law exists to
control case).
127. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding complaint alleging im-
proper training given to National Guard is clear example of type of issue reserved for
other branches of government than judiciary, as any decision would be political and
advisory in nature); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, No. 02-1580, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3233, at
*21-*22 (Apr. 28, 2004) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)) (enumerating Baker
six-prong test for determination if issue is political one). The six-prong test is:
[1 ] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coor-
dinate political department; or [2] a lack of'judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
[4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government; or
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at *21-*22 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
128. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766 (1972)
(quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)) (holding that for-
eign relations of U.S. government is constitutionally solely within purview of legislature
and executive and beyond scope ofjudicial review); see also Pearcy v. Strahan, 205 U.S.
257, 265 (1907) (holding determination of who is sovereign of non-U.S. Nation, either
de jure or de facto, is for legislative and executive and beyond scope of judicial review).
129. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pol-
lution Allowances and the "Polluter Pays" Principle, 24 HAIv. ENVTL. L. Riv. 465, 475 n.28
(2000) (noting rise in political question issues when dealing with pollution reduction
standards); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1353 (1985) (advocating that environmental law disputes are best
settled by legislature as political question exists); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environ-
mental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 703 (1999) (not-
ing some pollution reduction standards are politically motivated).
130. See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1358-59 (S.D. Fla.
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entirely settled, however, how close the corporation's allegedly
tortious actions must be to a State's actions or program.'3 113 2
This case could determine what extraterritorial application
ATCA has and what law must be broken for a valid suit against
the U.S. government and its agents, an extremely relevant hold-
ing for suits in the international environmental context.' 33
C. Using Qui Tam Actions To Gain Standing for Private Citizens or
NGOs in the Environmental Context
Whether a qui tam action satisfies the Article 11134 standing
2003) (holding suit against private corporation allowable under ATCA); National Coali-
tion Government of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 346-48 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (holding ATCA suits against private corporations allowable, but in context of
corporation as joint tortfeasor with government); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing
International Labor Standards: The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 203, 209-11 (2004) (noting rise in usage of ATCA claims against multinational
corporations particularly by employees); Demian Betz, Holding Multinational Corpora-
tions Responsible for Human Rights Abuses Committed by Security Forces in Conflict-Ridden Na-
tions: An Argument Against Exporting Federal Jurisdiction for the Purpose of Regulating Corpo-
rate Behavior Abroad, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 163, 187-88 (2001) (noting differences be-
tween multinational corporation ATCA suits and other types of multinational corporate
suits, as it is much easier to establish jurisdiction over corporations under ATCA provi-
sions than many other federal rights of actions).
131. See Unocal, 176 F.R.D. at 347 (holding ATCA suit permissible because corpora-
tion is alleged joint tortfeasor with government entity); see also Erin L. Borg, Sharing the
Blame for Septemer Eleventh: The Case for a New Law to Regulate the Activities of American
Corporations Abroad, 20 AM. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 607, 619-21 (2003) (noting malleability
of ATCA and uncertainty of how judges will apply it to corporations as it relies on
international law and not U.S. tort law); Sean D. Murphy, Department ofJustice Position in
Unocal Case, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 703, 703-04 (2003) (noting contrasting decisions on ex-
traterritorial applicability of ATCA, necessary nexus level required between corporate
action and government, and level of control plaintiff must demonstrate corporation
had over tortfeasor's actions).
132. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct: 2739, 72 U.S.L.W. 4660 (U.S. June 29,
2004), reversing 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear
Case About Foreigners' Use of Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at A16 (describing
oral arguments in Alvarez-Machain and speculating on Court's ruling).
133. See Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 612 (holding action under ATCA does not
necessarily have to arise under law of Nations but must simply violate law of Nations);
see also Luciana Reali, Alvarez-Machain v. United States: How Should the Ninth Circuit Deter-
mine Which Torts Are Actionable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 17 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 51, 67-
68 (2004) (noting expansive approach and application of ATCA taken by Ninth Circuit
in Alvarez).
134. See, e.g., Katherine M. Bailey, Citizen Participation in Environmental Enforcement
in Mexico and the United States: A Comparative Study, 16 GEO. INT'L ENwL. L. REv. 323,
351 (2004) (noting difficulty of U.S. plaintiffs to gain standing in environmental con-
text after Lujan decision); David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment,
and Other Contested Terms, 28 HARv. ENWL. L. REV. 79, 79-80 (2004) (noting inconsis-
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requirements for private citizens was once at issue in the courts,
but is now settled after U.S. Supreme Court stated that standing
was satisfied by FCA claims in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources
v. United States ex rel. Stevens.' 35 In fact, in Lujan, the Court took
pains to differentiate the situation there136 from the right of ac-
tion granted to private citizens under FCA.' 3 7 However, the
plaintiff's grounds for standing changed from the previous ratio-
nale of the "bounty" being the concrete interest, to the plaintiff
standing as an "assignee"13 8 of the penalty collected by the gov-
tency of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167 (2000), which held that Article III standing requirement met in environmental
context under environmental statute when individual plaintiff can demonstrate particu-
larized harm, even if no actual injury to environment occurs); Todd B. Adams, Is There a
Legal Future for Sustainable Development in Global Warming? Justice, Economics, and Protecting
the Environment, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 77, 92-96, 96 n.102 (2003) (addressing
difficulty of plaintiffs in ensuring safe environment and sustainable development for
future generations due to standing requirements).
135. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765 (2000) (holding that private citizen bringing qui tam action, the "relator,"
under the FCA satisfies Article III standing requirements). But see Eric S. Askanase, Qui
Tam and the False Claims Act: Criminal Punishment in Civil Disguise, 70 DEF. CouNs. J. 472,
473-74 (2003) (calling for reexamination of qui tam doctrine and outlining proposed
rationale for why it fails to satisfy Article III requirements). There is also disagreement
over whether the Article II Appointments Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, and the
"Take Care" obligation of the Executive allow qui tam suits. See id. at § 3 (stating "he
shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed. . . ."). The Supreme Court of the United States left the issue
open. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 778 n.8 (choosing not to decide issue of whether
qui tam actions violate Article II provisions). But see United States ex rel. Stone v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp, 282 F.3d 787, 804-07 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding FCA does not vio-
late Article II); Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749, 752-53 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that using same strain of analysis on Article I1 objections as used on Article III
objections will find qui tam actions valid).
136. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-74 (1992) (holding
plaintiffs did not have right of action because no concrete injury existed when hardship
claimed was loss of endangered species that plaintiffs did not have immediate concrete
intention of visiting again). Further, the plaintiffs were suing as both individuals and as
an NGO. See id. at 556, 568-74 (denying both individual and associational standing).
137. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572-73 (distinguishing plaintiffs' claims in instant action
from qui tam case where Congress has provided not only right of action but also cash
benefit and thus concrete interest).
138. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773 (holding citizen relator in qui tam suit
derives right of action under legal theory that assignee possesses same rights as princi-
pal); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Will Separation of Powers Challenges "Take Care" of Envi-
ronmental Citizen Suits? Artice II, Injury-in-Fact, Private "Enforcers," and Lessons From Qui
Tam Litigation, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 93, 146-48 (2001) (describing Vermont Agency
Court's analogy of qui tam relator to assignee of claim and holding that relator did not
have particularized harm but did have standing as assignee).
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ernment under FCA.139
FCA expressly prohibits suits based upon knowledge pub-
licly disclosed, 4 ' though this prohibition was softened with the
1986 Amendments to the Act.' As it became evident that more
relators would be allowed standing to bring qui tam actions
under FCA, 1 4 2 the number of suits brought drastically increased.
As this threat gained momentum, valid qui tam actions were also
used to force settlements with corporations,14 a potentially use-
139. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773 (noting that potential financial gain or
"bounty" creates particularized, concrete interest for individual when Congress grants
remuneration under FCA); see also Craig, supra note 138, at 147-55 (discussing nuanced
holding of Vermont Agency in that qui tam relator is not deemed to have sufficient partic-
ularized harm for standing but injury to U.S. government is sufficient when relator is
serving as assignee of United States).
140. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (4) (A)-(B) (2000) (holding no Court has subject mat-
terjurisdiction over publicly disclosed allegations unless person bringing action is "orig-
inal source"); see also United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh,
186 F.3d 376, 383 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding relator's claim barred as based upon infor-
mation publicly disclosed); United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians, 163 F.3d
516, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding portions of qui tam relator's case that are public
knowledge cannot be brought under FCA); Joel M. Androphy & Mark A. Correro,
Whistleblower and Federal Qui Tam Litigation-Suing the Corporation for Fraud, 45 S. TEx. L.
REV. 23, 55-58 (2003) (highlighting fact that published cases and public hearings can
bar qui tam actions in future); Emily R. D. Pruisner, The Extent of a Corporation's Ability to
Constitute an Original Source Under the False Claims Act-Minnesota Ass'n of Nurse Anesthe-
tists v. Allina Health System Corp., 87 MINN. L. REV. 1247, 1257-59 (2003) (discussing
historical bar on suits brought when information alleged has been publicized).
141. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (as amended 1986) (allowing for broader range of ac-
tions to be brought by private citizens); see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-660, at 17-18 (1986)
(noting need for amendments to FCA to combat fraud in United States); Pruisner,
supra note 140, at 1254-55 (recalling Congressional reaction to lack of FCA claims in
wake of rise in fraud as impetus for Amendment to FCA relaxing "public disclosure"
bar); Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 381, 390
(2001) (examining how rise in government contract abuse, e.g., reports of government
purchases of "$400 hammers and $600 toilet seats," was impetus for Congressional re-
laxation of FCA requirements).
142. See Bales, supra note 141, at 390 (noting large increase in number of qui tam
actions brought under FCA after 1986 amendments to FCA); see also Sandra Sugawara,
Blowing the Whistle Gets Louder; Increase in Fraud Suits Stirs Legal Community, WASH. POST,
Mar. 19, 1999, at F1 (reporting rise in qui tam actions against corporations); Bill
Rankin, False Claims Act Encourages Whistle-blowers to Come Forward, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
July 11, 1998, at B2 (noting suit brought against hospital under FCA reflective of Con-
gressional intent to encourage citizens to bring claims against those defrauding U.S.
government).
143. See, e.g. John E. Clark, Sharp, New Teeth for the State and Cash Rewards for Relators
Exposing Wrongdoers, 65 Tx. B.J. 120, 124 (2002) (examining large settlements by both
Bayer Corporation and TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. when qui tam actions
brought for fraudulent Medicaid practices); Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conserva-
tion as Aspecies of Information Policy, 89 IowA L. REv. 495, 535 n.271 (2004) (citing David
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ful tool in the environmental context, as plaintiffs can press for
environmental concessions in a settlement.14 4
Qui tam suits historically have been attempted in order to
gain standing for enforcement of environmental regulations. 45
Most environmental laws, however, left superfluous the round-
about method of citizens using FCA to enforce them.146 Fur-
ther, if an environmental law provides for only criminal penalties
and fines, it is unclear if a qui tam relator has standing in that
context.
147
One avenue for possible qui tam suits in Afghanistan and
A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REv. 35 (2000); Jamie A. Grodsky, The Paradox of (Eco)pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. Rv. 1037
(2003)) (noting environmental law is process of negotiation and bargaining between
interested parties and regulated entities).
144. See, e.g., Richard R. W. Brooks, Liability and Organizational Choice, 45 J.L. &
EcoN. 91, 91 n.1 (2002) (noting large settlement in Exxon Valdez case for environmen-
tal harms); Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the Public Right to Know: The Surpris-
ing Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 11 J. LAND USE &
ENVrL. L. 217, 278 n.351 (1996) (citing Settlement Reached in EPCRA Reporting Case,
[1993] 23 ENVWL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 2734 (noting company agreeing to settlement
with citizen organization over environmental issues)).
145. See, e.g. Robert V. Percival & Joanna B. Goger, Escaping the Common Law's
Shadow: Standing in the Light of Laidlaw, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'v F. 119, 121-22
(2001) (noting usage of qui tam suits by citizens against private parties for violating
federal environmental regulations); Valerie R. Park, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Rela-
tors, and the Government: Which is the Real Party to the Action, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1064
n.20 (1991) (citing RobertJ. Kavin & Neil E. Needleman, The Use of Qui Tam Actions to
Protect the Environment, 17 N.Y.L.F. 130 (1971); Allan W. May, Qui Tam Actions and the
Rivers and Harbors Act, 23 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 173 (1971)) (noting rise in usage of qui
tam suits to enforce environmental laws and commentators advocacy of this usage as
appropriate); Bucy, supra note 92, at 76 (advocating qui tam actions as tool to enforce
environmental law).
146. See, e.g., David Ashley Bagwell, Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 62 TUL. L.
REv. 433, 458 (1988) (describing historical usage of qui tam actions to enforce Rivers
and Harbors Act of 1899 ("Refuse Act"), 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982), but that Supreme
Court of United States's decision in California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981),
ended viability of this type of suit because Court held no implied right of action ex-
isted); Park, supra note 145, at 1064-65 (discussing reduction in usage of qui tam suits in
environmental regulation context); Bucy, supra note 92, at 76 (reporting underutiliza-
tion of qui tam suits in environmental context).
147. See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1868) (holding no
standing for private citizen as qui tam relator attempting to recover portion of fine); see
also Bass Angler Sportsman Society v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 415
(S.D. Ala. 1971) (holding claim of qui tam action to enforce environmental law carry-
ing only criminal penalty not valid as there is no private right of standing either express
or implied and citizen cannot share in monies collected as result of fine), affd sub nom.
Bass Anglers Sportsman Soc. of America, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir.
1971).
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Iraq that unfortunately has arisen is the alleged fraud committed
by the Halliburton Company, a U.S. government contractor, in
Iraq specifically.14 The company has also received contracts for
work in Afghanistan.' 49 A qui tam suit alleging fraud by Halli-
burton against the U.S. government would be extremely diffi-
cult, due to the requirements that the relator have specific
knowledge. It is also required that the knowledge come from
published or public hearings15' and if criminal charges are
brought against the company, the qui tam action is with-
drawn. 15 1
148. See, e.g., THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ- Pentagon Withholds Halliburton Payment,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at A16 (reporting Pentagon withholding payments from Hal-
liburton Co. until allegations of fraud investigated); David Ivanovich & Michael Hedges,
Halliburton Faces Criminal Investigation / Pentagon Probing Alleged Overcharges for Iraq Fuel,
Hous. CHRON., Feb. 24, 2004, available at 2004 WL 57810221 (reporting on alleged
fraud committed by Halliburton Co. in Iraq); Russell Gold & Christopher Cooper, Pen-
tagon Weighs Criminal Charges of Halliburton Arm, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2004, available at
2004 WL-WSJ 56920882 (noting investigation into whether Halliburton subsidiary, Kel-
logg Brown & Root, fraudulently bilked U.S. government with fuel pricing).
149. See David Rohde, G.I. 's in Afghanistan on Hunt, but Now for Hearts and Minds,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at A6 (noting soldiers interviewed eat meals in "chow hall"
operated by Halliburton Co.); see also Ernest Holsendolph, Editorial, OUR OPINIONS:
Halliburton's Welcome Worn Out, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 18, 2004, at A12, available at
2004 WL 68884611 (noting Halliburton's reception of large government contracts in
both Afghanistan and Iraq).
150. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (4) (A)-(B) (2000) (holding no Court has subject mat-
terjurisdiction over publicly disclosed allegations unless person bringing action is "orig-
inal source"); see also United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh,
186 F.3d 376, 383 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding relator's claim barred as based upon infor-
mation publicly disclosed); United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians, 163 F.3d
516, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding portions of qui tam relator's case that are public
knowledge cannot be brought under FCA); Androphy & Correro, supra note 140, at 55-
58 (noting traditional bar against qui tam suits brought when allegations have been
published or part of public hearings); Pruisner, supra note 140, at 1257-59 (noting his-
torical prohibition against qui tam suits that contain any publicized facts or allega-
tions).
151. See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. at 74 (holding no qui tam action available when
alleged monies owed government are result of criminal penalties); see also Bass Angler
Sportsman Soc., 324 F. Supp. at 415 (holding qui tam action seeking remuneration for
violation of environmental statue containing criminal fines invalid); Ivanovich &
Hedges, supra note 148 (noting criminal investigation into Halliburton gasoline pric-
ing); Gold & Cooper, supra note 148 (noting Pentagon investigation into possible crimi-
nal charges against Halliburton).
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III. CREATIVE METHODS TO GAIN STANDING IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCENARIO
A. Possible Private Actions for Citizens and NGOs To Protect the
Environment of Afghanistan
1. U.S. Citizen and NGO Suits Brought Under
Existing U.S. Law
The most difficult bar to U.S. citizens and NGOs bringing
suits protecting the Afghan environment under existing U.S. law
is the standing requirement laid out in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life.' 52 The particularized harm, redressability, and traceability
elements that must be satisfied for a private environmental suit
to be valid make it difficult for a U.S. citizen to have standing for
actions abroad. 15' Thus, it is difficult to imagine that even if
Congress responded to calls for legislation granting citizen
rights of action for environmental damage in Afghanistan,' 54 a
U.S. plaintiff could satisfy the threshold standing require-
ment. 55
2. Suits by Afghan Nationals for Environmental Harms
Committed by U.S. Government or Its Agencies Under ATCA
Suits by Afghan citizens against U.S. government entities or
corporations under ATCA for environmental harm have a better
chance of success than suits by U.S. nationals.'5 6 It is much
more likely that such a plaintiff would satisfy the standing re-
quirements that bar many suits brought by U.S. citizens and
152. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty for private
citizen or NGO to satisfy standing requirements of Lujan that demand particularized
harm for plaintiff).
153. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (analyzing difficulty of satisfy-
ing three pronged requirements for standing when alleged harm is abroad).
154. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional re-
sponse to Gwaltney case with Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 which gave general
grant of citizen suit to facilitate enforcement and holding of Lujan requires three-pro-
nged standing requirement be met by plaintiff even in light of generalized Congres-
sional grant of standing).
155. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (noting difficulty of plaintiff to
satisfy standing requirements for citizen suit as any plaintiff must satisfy three-pronged
requirement of particularized harm or injury, traceability or causation inquiry, and
redressability of harm by potential favorable ruling to have standing to sue even in light
of generalized grant of citizen right of action by Congress).
156. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text (discussing both attempted and
proposed usage of ATCA as litigation weapon for environmental harm caused by U.S.
government, citizens, or corporations).
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NGOs. 5 7 It is already apparent that environmental harm has
been done in Afghanistan.' 58 In fact, one commentator has sug-
gested that U.S. military actions in the country have already vio-
lated existing international law and inordinately damaged the
Afghan environment.' 59 Should a U.S. court apply a liberal in-
terpretation of the Geneva Protocols and Hague Conventions 60
(to both of which the United States is a party), they would be
deemed existing international law and treaties to which the
United States is a party, satisfying the third and most difficult
prong of an ATCA claim.16' The failure of such an action, how-
ever, is likely in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain.'62
3. Use of Qui Tam Actions To Gain Standing for Afghan
Environmental Actions
The use of qui tam actions in the environmental context is
not without historical basis. 163 The standing inquiry is not as dif-
ficult as the one outlined in Lujan'6 4 as the Court there distin-
guished the qui tam relator's status from that of a plaintiff bring-
157. See supra notes 94-98 (discussing Lujan holding that any plaintiff must satisfy
three-pronged requirement of particularized harm or injury, traceability or causation
inquiry, and redressability of harm by potentially favorable ruling to have standing to
sue even in light of generalized grant of citizen right of action by Congress).
158. See supra notes 34-35, 46, 52, 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing current
environmental problems facing Afghanistan and how recent lengthy history of military
conflict has exacerbated these issues).
159. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (denominating usage of cluster
bombs, depleted uranium munitions, and the targeting of environmentally sensitive
sites as violative of existing international law).
160. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (noting Geneva Conventions and
Hague Conventions call for care to be given to environment even in times of war).
161. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (noting ATCA's third element,
that the tort be "committed in violation of law of nations or treaty of United States" is
most difficult hurdle for plaintiff to satisfy to bring valid claim).
162. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (acknowledging Supreme
Court's decision in Sosa as limiting scope of ATCA to eighteenth centuries breaches of
international customary law and torture, which seems to preclude right of action for
environmental damage).
163. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (noting historical usage of qui
tam relator actions brought under FCA to enforce environmental statutes and discuss-
ing Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765
(2000), holding that private citizen bringing qui tam action under FCA satisfies Article
III standing requirements).
164. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (noting difficulty of plaintiff to
satisfy standing requirements for citizen suit in wake of Lujan holding any plaintiff must
satisfy three-pronged requirement of particularized harm or injury, traceability or cau-
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ing right of action under generalized Congressional grant.
1 65
However, FCA's 16 6 grant of a right of action is limited to a nar-
row set of circumstances where the plaintiff has specific knowl-
edge of fraudulent behavior by the defendant.'6
The revelation of possible fraudulent transactions by the
Halliburton Company and its subsidiaries168 has at least raised
the possibility of an FCA claim being brought by someone with
knowledge of harm done to the Afghan environment. A success-
ful claim would require a very narrow set of potential plaintiffs
with specific knowledge.' 69 Thus, the probability of both such a
plaintiff existing and the ,claim being successful as to environ-
mental harm170 is extremely low.
B. Potentially Valid Claims for Citizens and NGOs To Enforce
Environmental Protection of Iraq or Attempt To Recoup
Damages for Harm Done
1. Existing U.S. Law As Basis for U.S. Citizen or NGO Suits
The same difficulties for establishing valid standing in an
environmental suit under existing U.S. environmental law thwart
potential U.S. citizen and NGO plaintiffs in the Iraqi context as
the Afghan one. 71 The difference, however, is that the status of
sation inquiry, and redressability of harm by potential favorable ruling to have standing
to sue even in light of generalized grant of citizen right of action by Congress).
165. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court's differen-
tiation of qui tam action from standing analysis applied to plaintiffs in that case).
166. See supra notes 92, 138-41 and accompanying text (noting that FCA grants
right of action to any person bringing suit alleging defrauding of U.S. government as
long as certain substantive and procedural criteria are met).
167. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing that FCA claims are
limited to individuals who have specific knowledge of fraud that has not been published
and when criminal charges have not been brought against defendant by U.S. govern-
ment).
168. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (reporting allegations of fraud
against Halliburton for actions specific to Iraq, but also noting Halliburton's presence
in Afghanistan).
169. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (stating that FCA claims are
limited to those individuals who have specific knowledge of fraudulent activities that
have not been published nor have criminal charges been brought against defendant by
U.S. government).
170. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (noting historical usage of qui
tam relator actions brought under FCA to enforce environmental statutes but recent
difficulty in bringing such claims).
171. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (noting difficulties of plaintiffs to gain stand-
ing in international environmental suit, especially after Lujan decision).
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U.S. forces as occupiers' 7 2 brings with it certain responsibilities.
Thus, U.S. citizens could sue to enforce these duties, as they pre-
sumably are actionable U.S. law.' 73
2. ATCA As Basis for Suit by Iraqi Citizens To
Protect Environment
As discussed above, 17 4 ATCA is an attractive avenue for non-
U.S. plaintiffs to bring suit in U.S. courts for harms committed
abroad.175 The recently rediscovered 176 grant of a right of action
is difficult in the environmental context because of the require-
ment that the tort committed violate the law of Nations or treaty
of the United States. 177
The declaration of U.S. forces in Iraq as occupying ones,
and the concurrent international law obligations that status car-
ries, 17 could provide the necessary "law of Nations" critical for a
successful ATCA claim.1 79 The environmental duties that occu-
pying forces must fulfill 8 ° create potentially actionable suits
should they be transgressed. An Iraqi citizen would thus have a
valid ATCA claim and would presumably have a particularized
injury that would stand up to any standing scrutiny.
172. See supra notes 4, 38, 62, 124 and accompanying text (noting specific obliga-
tions of U.S. in Iraq after UN Security Council Res. 1483 that declared it an occupying
force).
173. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (noting that valid treaties im-
plemented by legislation become part of U.S. law as well).
174. See discussion supra Part III.A.2 (outlining possible successful ATCA claim in
environmental context brought by Afghan citizen).
175. See supra notes 113-32 and accompanying text (discussing possible applica-
tions of ATCA by non-U.S. citizens in U.S. courts to environmental torts committed
abroad).
176. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (noting history of ATCA dates back
to Judiciary Act of 1789 but only relatively recently has it come back into vogue as
popular cause of action).
177. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of envi-
ronmental law claims under ATCA due to lack of widely held international environmen-
tal law and U.S. withdrawal from several environmental treaties).
178. See supra notes 4, 38, 62, 124 and accompanying text (noting specific obliga-
tions of U.S. in Iraq after UN Security Council Res. 1483 that declared it an occupying
force).
179. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of envi-
ronmental law claims under ATCA due to third prong requirement of alleged tortious
action violating law of Nations or U.S. treaty).
180. See supra notes 4, 38 and accompanying text (noting environmental obliga-
tions of occupying forces to occupied Nation including preservation of resources and
protection of drinkable water).
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3. Qui Tam Actions Potentially Brought by Citizens
Containing Knowledge of Fraud
The FCA grant of rights of action requires a specific set of
circumstances for the plaintiff to have standing to sue. 8 While
the qui tam relator is able to withstand the standing inquiry
called for in Lujan,18 2 the limitations on the availability of the
knowledge of the specific fraud and the prohibition of its publi-
cation or the commencement of a criminal action by the govern-
ment make it persist as a difficult case to make.' 83
The possibility of extensive fraud by U.S. government con-
tractors and agencies was highlighted by the allegations against
the Halliburton Company."8 4 The publication of these allega-
tions and pursuit of criminal charges against the company basi-
cally prohibit a valid qui tam action arising out of the same
facts.18 5 A similar set of circumstances with either Halliburton or
another contractor in Iraq might provide a viable FCA claim, or
at least force a settlement in which the plaintiff could dictate
favorable terms including restoration of any environmental dam-
age.18 6 Thus, a person with specific knowledge of fraudulent ac-
tions by a U.S. entity in Iraq with environmental ramifications
could not only stop the harm, but recoup some of the monies of
which the entity bilked the U.S. government.1
8 7
181. See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (outlining requisite knowledge plaintiff must
possess and substantive and procedural guidelines that must be followed for successful
FCA claim).
182. See supra notes 135-41 (noting specific right of action granted by FCA differ-
ent than generalized grant provided in many U.S. statutes and that role of qui tam
relator is one of "assignee" of potential recovery of financial recuperation and thus has
particularized interest).
183. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing fact that FCA claims
are limited to individuals who have specific knowledge of fraud that has not been pub-
lished and when criminal charges have not been brought against the defendant by the
U.S. government).
184. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (noting allegations of fraud
against Halliburton for actions specific to Iraq, but also noting Halliburton's presence
in Afghanistan).
185. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text (noting prohibition against
bringing FCA claim based upon facts published or part of public hearings and fact that
allegations against Halliburton are widely known).
186. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (recalling that some large set-
tlements received from corporations when plaintiffs sued for environmental harm
under FCA).
187. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (advocating use of FCA in envi-
ronmental context and discussing FCA's grant standing and portion of recovered mon-
ies to any individual bringing claim that party defrauded U.S. government).
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CONCLUSION
The protection of the Afghan and Iraqi environments is an
issue that has not received much attention in recent months, but
one that is fundamental to the successful implementation of de-
mocracy, market economy, and a viable infrastructure. Unfortu-
nately, the status of U.S. law allows actions by U.S. government
agencies, contractors, and U.S. corporations to go unchecked by
citizens and NGOs, unless very narrow exceptions are met.
Hopefully, the Congress and U.S. courts will respond and allow
watchful citizens to ensure respect for and protection of the en-
vironments of Afghanistan and Iraq.
